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GROUND RULES FOR CUSTODY MEDIATION AND
MODIFICATION
Andrew Schepard*
Melissa D. Philbrick**

Dvora Wolff Rabino***
A national movement 1 has developed to encourage, and in some
states require, mediation' for divorcing couples involved in child cus-

tody disputes.3 The impetus for the movement toward mediation is a
perception that a fault-based, win-or-lose custody dispute resolution
system of litigation4 disserves the child's best interests by encourag* Associate Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law; J.D. Harvard University,
1972; Cofounder of Columbia Law School's Clinical Seminar in Advocacy for Children.
J.D. Columbia University, 1984.
* J.D. Columbia University, 1983.
We thank Vivian Berger, Cofounder of the Clinical Seminar in Advocacy for Children, for her
dedicated editorial comments on several drafts of this article. We also thank Jane Spinak,
Cofounder of the Clinical Seminar in Advocacy for Children and its current Director; Dr. Paul
Nassar, a Cofounder of the Clinical Seminar and its Consulting Psychiatrist; Nina Freedman,
the Clinical Seminar's Director of Social Services; and Richard Briffault, for their comments on
an earlier draft. Finally, we thank Linda Silberman for her comments on drafts of the mediation retainer agreement that the article describes and general support and encouragement. Responsibility for what follows is, of course, our own.
I Richard Crouch, an active critic of attorney involvement in private divorce mediation, has
observed, "It is as difficult today to be against mediation as it once was to be against motherhood. This dispute-resolution process is riding the crest of an immense wave of fad appeal,
within both the professions and the media." Crouch, Mediation and Divorce: The Dark Side Is
Still Unexplored, 4 FAM. ADvoc. 27 (1982). We disagree with Mr. Crouch's characterization of
mediation as a "fad" but do agree with his observation that support for mediation in family
disputes is building nationwide. See Newsweek, Jan. 10, 1983, at 42-45; Simon, The Growth of
Divorce Mediation, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 30, 1982, at 1, 6-7.
2 See generally Fuller, Mediation - Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CALIF. L. REV. 305
(1971).
8 Mediation programs range from the pilot programs of a particular judge, for example,
Judge Frank Orlando's custody mediation service in Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida,
See Orlando, Where and How - Conciliation Courts, in ALTERNATE MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 111-51 (1982), to legislatively mandated mediation services, see, e.g., CAL. CIv.
CODE § 4607 (West Supp. 1983) (mandating mediation of private custody disputes); MICH.
Comp. LAWS § 552.513 (Supp. 1983) (directing that the State's Friend of the Court office make

mediation available to couples who desire it, either directly or by contracting with private
mediators). See generally Comeaux, Procedural Controls in Public Sector Domestic Relations
Mediation, in ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION 79, 85 (1982); Coombs,
Noncourt-ConnectedMediation and Counseling in Child-Custody Disputes, 17 FAM. L.Q. 469
(1984).
4 See generally M. Rosenberg, The Adversary System and Dispute Processing In Our Society
(paper presented at the National Conference on the Lawyer's Changing Role in Resolving Dis-
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ing parents to use their children, even unconsciously, as pawns in the
divorce war.5 The adversary model of dispute resolution, it is said,
can discourage communication and cooperation between parents
about their children during a time of great stress in the lives of all
family members.' It is during this time that such familial interaction
is most needed.' As a result, the adversary process can exacerbate the
trauma of divorce for the children, 8 turning an already significant developmental crisis into a potential personality dislocation of even
greater magnitude. 9
In contrast, proponents of custody mediation argue that face-toface negotiations between the parents, encouraged and supervised by
a neutral third party, can facilitate the parents' transition from the
hostility or alienation that may result from the breakdown of their
relationship to a constructive, cooperative approach to their joint
putes, Harvard Law School, October 14-16, 1982) (publication forthcoming 1984).
6 J. HAYNES, DIVORCE MEDIATION 3 (1981); H. IRVING, DIVORCE MEDIATION: A RATIONAL ALTERNATIVE TO THE ADVERSARY SYsTEM 19-20 (1981). See generally J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY,
SURVIVING THE BREAK-UP (1980).
' See H. IRVING, supra note 5, at 38; Pearson, Child Custody: Why Not Let the Parents
Decide?, 20 JUDGES J. 4, 6 (1981).
7 J. WALLETRSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 5, at 26-51, 108-113. Wallerstein and Kelly conclude that:
Divorcing parents. . . face a bewildering array of tasks in putting their own lives in new
and better order and in shaping the relationships of the postdivorce family. Many will
need help in setting up postdivorce arrangements for the children and especially in arriving at the mutual understanding on which such arrangements must be based in order to
endure. For people who have decided to separate from each other in sorrow and anger,
joint planning is very difficult to achieve. . . . [D]ivorcing with children requires of the
adults who had once been together the capacity to maintain entirely separate social and
sexual roles while continuing their cooperation as parents on behalf of their children.
Id. at 317-18.
o Courts have characterized custody disputes as "acrimonious and counter-productive litigation" and have noted that "children inevitably become pawns to be sacrificed in what ultimately becomes a very cynical game." Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 362 (W. Va. 1981)
(establishing a presumption of custody for the primary caretaking parent as a disincentive to
custody battles). Researchers have stressed that parental conflict over children undergoing divorce should be minimized because the child's adaption to the eventual divorce will be affected
by the extent to which the custodial arrangements were made in conflict. Watson, The Children
of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 55 (1969). See J.
WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 5; Pearson, supra note 6, at 6 ("The psychological literature tells us that divorce is significantly more damaging to children of all ages when it becomes
a prolonged procedure fraught with bickering, and when children themselves become the focus
of the divorce dispute.").
o See generally Watson, supra note 8. For descriptive accounts of adversary custody disputes
from the child's perspective, see J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 5, at 51-54; S. Meehan,
Child Custody Disputes: The Experiences of Children and the Implications for Social Policy
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation 1982) (available through University Microfilms International).
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concern for their child. 10 Mediation, it has been suggested, helps to
protect a child's interest in maintaining significant positive relationships with both of his parents following their separation.11 To the
extent that mediation facilitates speedy, private resolution of the intensely personal emotions and issues involved in parental custody
disputes and encourages both parents to maintain a significant role in
the child's life, it furthers the child's interest in an environment that
closely approximates the functioning of the pre-separation family."
This Article describes an approach to resolving some of the strategic and ethical problems faced by attorneys who wish to mediate the
custody disputes of divorcing parents. Part I of the Article sets forth
some of the issues custody mediators necessarily confront and the
setting in which we attempted to resolve them. Part II discusses the
mediation ground rules that we developed to ensure that the mediation process would be both beneficial for the child and his family and
ethical for attorneys working with mental health professionals. Because future disputes might develop and circumstances could change,
Part III suggests a mechanism to be included in separation agreements for reevaluating and, if necessary, modifying custody agreements reached through mediation. Finally, Part IV suggests factors
that courts might consider in reviewing custody agreements that are
developed through mediation. Appendix A reprints the full text of
the mediation retainer agreement that describes our ground rules for
the mediation process. Appendix B reprints that portion of a custody
agreement that we developed in mediation which describes a mechanism for settling parents' future custody disputes.
As will be evident from what follows, our experience makes us opti10J. HAYNES, supra note 5, at 5, 11-12; Fuller, supra note 2, at 325; Pearson, supra note 6, at
6, 10; Winks, Divorce Mediation: A Non Adversarial Procedurefor the No-Fault Divorce, 19 J.
FAM. LAW. 615, 650-51 (1981).
" J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 5, at 307-08, 310-11 (empirical study suggesting

the psychological importance to the child of continuing contact with both parents). See Steinman, Joint Custody: What We Know, What We Have Yet to Learn, and the Judicial and
Legislative Implications, 16 U.C.D.L. Rev. 739, 746-47 (1983). But see J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD,

& A. SOLNIT,

BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD

31-40 (2d ed. 1979) (the child's need

for stability and continuity requires the custody award to and the involvement of only one
"psychological" parent and visitation by the noncustodial parent at the "psychological" parent's discretion). This position of Goldstein, Freud and Solnit has been sharply criticized as
unsupported by available empirical evidence and of questionable constitutionality. See, e.g.,
Novinson, Post-Divorce Visitation: Untying the Triangular Knot, 1 ILL. L. REV. 121, 140-74
(1983); Strauss & Strauss, Book Review, 74 COLuM. L. REv. 996 (1974).
" Pearson, supra note 6. See Steinman, supra note 11. See also M. Rosenberg, supra note 4,
at 19-22; Cooke, Mediation - A Boon to Courts and Citizens, 20 CT. REV. 8, 9 (1982); Mnookin
& Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950
(1979).
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mistic that mediation by attorneys working with mental health professionals is a useful procedure for encouraging some parents with
potential or actual custody disputes to settle their differences, control
their antagonism towards each other and work together cooperatively
for the sake of their children. We do not pretend to have the data or
broad experience that would permit us to compare the outcomes of
mediated custody disputes with the outcomes of those custody disputes that are resolved through litigation or through negotiations between parents, with or without the participation of lawyers, therapists and custody evaluators."3 Rather, we offer our thoughts with
the hope of adding to the continuing, useful dialogue on how custody
mediation can and should be conducted to serve the best interests of
children.

I.

THE FRAMEWORK FOR OUR MEDIATION

Our involvement in custody mediation began in 1983, when Columbia Law School's Clinical Seminar in Advocacy for Children' 4 ("the
Clinic") received an unsolicited request from a separated 5 couple
who wished us to mediate issues regarding custody of their child. The
Clinic is an interdisciplinary endeavor staffed by law students, 6 law
faculty supervisors and affiliated mental health professionals, including a consulting psychiatrist and a full-time social worker. Usually,
the Clinic is formally appointed by the Family Court as a "law guardian" for children in custody disputes and foster care cases.' 7 In this
instance, however, the couple that requested our aid in mediating
Is Compare Pearson & Thoennes, Mediating and Litigating Custody Disputes:A Longitudinal Evaluation, 17 FAM. L.Q. 497 (1984) with Levy, Comment on the Pearson-ThoennesStudy
and on Mediation, 17 FAM. L.Q. 525 (1984) and Pearson & Thoennes, Dialogue: A Reply to
Professor Levy's Comment, 17 FAM. L.Q. 535 (1984).
' The Clinical Seminar in Advocacy for Children operates under the official name of Morningside Heights Legal Services, a nonprofit corporation established by Columbia Law School to
administer its clinical programs.
15 We use the words "separated" or "separation" in a popular rather than legal sense
throughout this article to describe situations where at least one spouse believes the emotional
relationship with the other spouse is over and as a result seeks to change the allocation of the
couple's parental rights and responsibilities.
"6 See N.Y. JUD. LAW. §§ 478, 484 (McKinney 1983). Sections 478 and 484 of the Judiciary

Law enable law students to gain valuable experience in clinical seminars by representing clients
under the supervision of law school faculty in a program approved by the New York appellate
courts. Clients, of course, must be informed of and consent to their representation by a student
"attorney." See infra note 106.
17 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 249 (McKinney Supp. 1983) (authorizing court appointment of
law guardians in Family Court cases).
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their dispute had no divorce or custody action pending in any court.
Nor did they provide us with any guidance as to what they expected
from "mediation."
Since the Clinic's interest in reducing trauma for the children of
divorcing parents could be furthered by extending help to couples
that had not yet invoked court process to settle their dispute, we decided to accept the couple's request for mediation services. Before we
undertook the project, however, we wished to clarify the family's and
our own expectations about what mediation involved. We therefore
decided to formulate a set of "ground rules" for the process.
In creating those ground rules, we sought to answer the following
typical questions that a prospective lawyer-mediator faces: How active a role should the mediator assume in the discussions? What legal
standards, if any, should inform the mediator's suggestions to the
parents? What subjects should be open for negotiation? Who is the
mediator's "client"? Should the parents or the child retain independent counsel and, if so, how would outside attorneys be involved in
the mediation process? What role should nonlawyer mental health
professionals play in the mediation effort? To what degree should
mediators be authorized to do independent investigation and thus invade the privacy of the couple seeking help in resolving their dispute? If the mediation should fail and the custody issues are litigated, what, if anything, revealed in mediation should be disclosed in
court? What should be kept "confidential" between the spouses and
the mediator, and what should not? How can the mediation process
be structured to encourage courts to give maximum deference to mediated custody agreements?
Lawyers do not ordinarily prepare such a long list of hypothetical
questions before accepting a new client. In our judgment, however, a
set of operational ground rules embodied in a written retainer agreement was necessary in this case because many of the ethical problems
posed by lawyer-assisted mediation are still largely unresolved. The
Code of Professional Responsibility, in particular, furnishes little
guidance to lawyers functioning as mediators.18 The lawyers' ethical
,8 The Family Law Section of the American Bar Association has recently taken a step towards reducing the uncertainty facing lawyers who want to act as mediators in family disputes

by promulgating and publishing Standards of Practice for Family Mediators. STANDARDS OF
PRACTICE FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS (1984), reprinted in 17 FAM. L.Q. 455 (1984). The Family Law
Section's Standards were not available when we drafted the custody mediation retainer agreement that is the subject of this article. Upon analyzing the Standards, however, we find that
they are, in large part, consistent with our retainer agreement. But see infra notes 21, 114, 138,

151, & 154. The Standards have been adopted in principle by the Family Law Section, see
Loeb, Introduction to the Standards of Practice for Family Mediators, 17 FAM. L.Q. 451, 453
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code was developed in the context of a legal system in which judges

authoritatively resolve issues based on facts and law presented by
parties with adversary interests; it is designed primarily to describe
the proper limits on the lawyer's advocacy role. For that reason, it

does not focus on the particular problems of mediation in setting
forth its general ethical standards. For example, are a lawyer-media-

tor's suggestions for settlement required to be limited to those consistent with existing law? The Code does not explicitly impose such an
obligation, and some mediation proponents do not emphasize compli-

ance with legal standards as a goal. 19 At best, the Code provides the
prospective lawyer-mediator with an enumeration of the ethical issues she may encounter and a vague delineation of the outer boundaries of acceptable behavior.2 We believed that these circumstances
gave us, as prospective mediators, a special obligation of self-regulation that the very process of developing a written retainer agreement

helps fulfill."
(1984), but without commentary, see Bishop, The Standardsof Practicefor Family Mediators:
An Individual Interpretation and Comments, 17 FAM. L.Q. 461, 463 (1984), suggesting that
they might be modified in the future. The Standards are advisory only, in the sense that state
bar associations, not the American Bar Association, have rulemaking authority for regulating
the professional conduct of lawyers, Bishop, supra at 462. We will make reference to the Standards in this article, even though they did not influence the drafting of our mediation retainer
agreement, in the hope of contributing to discussion about their merits.
19 For example, John Haynes states that his aim for his book on divorce mediation is to
"establish that people can be empowered to negotiate their own divorce settlement outside of
the legal system." J. HAYsS, supra note 5, at xi (emphasis added). Nowhere in his list of eight
criteria used to measure a "successful" divorce mediation is there an explicit statement that a
settlement should reflect existing legal norms and doctrines on any issues. Id. at 127-28.
,o The ABA Family Law Section's attempt to describe specific standards of practice for family mediators, see supra note 18, is in effect, an admission that the current lawyers' code of
professional conduct is inadequate for establishing rules of conduct for lawyers acting as
mediators.
" The American Bar Association's current Model Code of Professional Responsibility and
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct recently proposed by the American Bar Association,
encourage lawyers to put fee agreements in writing. Compare MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-19 (1980) with MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(b)
(1983) and MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 comment (1983). Some kind of

written retainer agreement between lawyer and client is thus the preferred legal practice.
The ABA Family Law Section's Standards of Practice for Family Mediators impose a general
obligation on the mediator to "define and describe the process of mediation and its cost before
reaching an agreement to mediate," STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS art. I
(A)(1)-(7), supra note 18, at 455-56, and a specific obligation to have the parties to the mediation agree in writing that the mediator will not be required to disclose to third parties what is
said during the mediation, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS art. II(A), supra
note 18, at 456. See infra note 138. The Standards do not impose a general requirement that a
mediation retainer agreement be in writing. They also apparently do not even require that the
mediator's fee arrangements be in writing and, to that extent, seem inconsistent with at least
the spirit of Rule 1.5(b) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
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The couple that requested our help ultimately signed our retainer
agreement and entered into mediation conducted by the Clinic. To
protect the couple's confidences, we will not discuss the details of
their dispute or their mediation in this article. It is important to
note, however, that we drafted a formal, written custody and child
support agreement for the couple that embodied the parents' ultimate decision to share decision-making, physical care and financial
support of their child during an informal separation period pending
divorce.
In drafting the parents' final agreement, we gave substantial
thought to how they could deal with disputes about its terms or operation and with changed circumstances that might undermine its
premises. The parents' signatures on a written custody agreement at
the conclusion of the mediation would not be the end of the family's
adaptation to a post-divorce environment. We therefore deemed it
essential that the family establish a mechanism through which it
could deal with any future disputes or changes in circumstances with
minimal emotional and economic costs, in the same spirit of cooperation that we sought to encourage in the initial mediation sessions."s
With this in mind, we included in the parents' custody agreement a
series of clauses comprising what can loosely be called a custody
modification dispute resolution mechanism. The modification procedures begin with face-to-face negotiations between the parents alone
and, if the dispute is not resolved, proceed to mediation and, perhaps, to arbitration.
A note of caution is warranted at the outset. Every mediation retainer agreement or future dispute resolution mechanism must be
specifically tailored to the circumstances of both the mediator and
the family members affected by the dispute. Our circumstances were
those of a law school-based, interdisciplinary clinic undertaking priThe Standards seem to us inadequate in this respect. When a lawyer engages in a dispute
resolution process like mediation, one with which the client is relatively unfamiliar, we believe a
more detailed written retainer agreement that includes a description of fee arrangements is
necessary to clarify the role expectations of all concerned. The retainer agreement serves as a
valuable checklist of issues to discuss with the client before mediation begins. It also serves to
protect the lawyer from charges of fraud and overreaching should the relationship of mediator
and client deteriorate. Finally, it is an aid to a court that might have to decide what weight to
give a custody agreement reached through mediation. See infra text accompanying notes 17985. We thus encourage other attorney-mediators to employ a detailed written retainer agreement and the Family Law Section to modify the Standards to require a written retainer
agreement.
2 J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 5, at 316-17.
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vate mediation' 3 in New York State without compensation.2 4 Uncritical use of our agreements in materially different circumstances would
be unwise. We offer what we developed instead as a stimulus for further discussion and as a checklist of the issues to be considered
before a lawyer assumes the mediator's role.
We recognize that our retainer agreement and modification provisions were developed in an optimal environment. As members of a
clinic affiliated with a large university, we did not have to worry
about collecting fees to keep the lights on. We have a small caseload,
a great deal of discretion in choosing our cases, an excellent mental
health staff with whom to consult continuously, and the luxury of
being able to devote substantial care and attention to each matter we
undertake. We believe, however, that this article and the sample provisions it describes fulfill what we hope will be an increasingly important function of clinical projects at law schools - experimenting with
models for the delivery of legal services that can then be replicated in
and adapted to other settings. It is our hope that future attorneymediators can benefit from the mediation and modification procedures that the Clinic developed.
II.

THE RETAINER AGREEMENT

25
A. Issues To Be Mediated and Standards To Be Applied

We began the retainer agreement with an explicit statement of the
33 Private mediation services such as ours should be distinguished from public mediation
programs such as California's, which are implemented under the auspices of the courts and
treat mediation as a public function. See supra note 3. Public mediation is often conducted by
a state employee whose formal court affiliation may give him a degree of coercive power to
compel the family to participate in the mediation and to influence the court decision through
recommendations if mediation fails. Cf. McLaughlin v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 3d 473,
483, 189 Cal. Rptr. 479, 486 (Ct. App. 1983) (parties have a right to cross-examine mediator/
evaluator who makes custodial recommendations to the court under California's mandatory mediation program). The mediation process we developed, in contrast, began with the assumption
that participation by all concerned was voluntary and that the clients could withdraw at any
time without sanctions.
We recognize that because our mediation services were free of charge, as required by the
Clinic's student practice order, see supra note 16, we had a greater degree of freedom from
economic constraints - both our own and the family's - than attorneys conducting private
mediation on a fee basis will enjoy. Presumably, if we had conducted the mediation for a fee,
the cost would have been divided between the parents equally based on their respective abilities to pay. The ABA Family Law Section's Standards of Practice for Family Mediators prohibit mediators from making contingent fee arrangements with couples to which services are
provided. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMLY MEDIATORS art. I(A)(5), supra note 18, at 456.
25 See Appendix A, 1 1 for the portion of the retainer agreement dealing with the issues
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Clinic's perception of the proper focus and agenda of the mediation
process. Rather than assume that any parental agreement resulting
from mediation would inevitably be in the child's interests because it
would represent a willing compromise between the parents, 26 we
structured the mediation around the relevant legal standard:2 7 the
best interests of the child.
We are, of course, familiar with the trenchant criticisms of the
vagueness and uncertainty of the "best interests" standard.2 9 The
elasticity of the concept could leave a mediator free to define it as she
wished, raising the danger that the mediator would, consciously or
unconsciously, impress her own values on the couple.30
discussed in this section of the article.
,0 This appears to be the position of John Haynes, who has written:
The mediator must always remember his/her primary function, that is, to facilitate the
negotiations of some other persons' divorce or separation agreement. When the agreement is drawn up it belongs to the couple and affects their future lives and the lives of
the children ....
The mediator has the power to influence the couple in any given direction. However, if
s/he moves the couple too far out of an acceptable pattern, the possibility develops that
although the arrangement is written into the agreement, the couple actually operate
under [its] own idea of what is proper. In that case the mediator has helped draft an
agreement that will be honored in the breach, with all the consequent legal dangers.
J. HAYNES, supra note 5, at 135. Although Haynes suggests here that the mediator's function is
to facilitate agreement regardless of governing legal standards and norms, he suggests elsewhere
that the mediator seek to achieve certain substantive goals for the family: "an uncoupling of
the spouses in a way that leaves no victims, allows the couple open lines of communication
between themselves, and provides each child with a direct and open line of communication to
each parent." Id. at 35. Haynes never seems to resolve the tension between these competing
views We suggest that the dilemma be resolved in favor of the child's interests in maintaining
communication with both parents.
" Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct the attorney may restrict the scope of the
representation by limiting its objectives in advance if the client consents. MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(c) (1983). The Family Law Section's Standards of Practice for
Family Mediators strongly imply, but do not specifically state, that the mediator can limit the
subjects to be covered in the mediation with the participants' consent. See STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS art. I(A)(2), (3), supra note 18, at 456.
18N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW. § 240 (McKinney Supp. 1983). The Standards of Practice for Family
Mediators agree that the mediator has a duty to promote the best interests of the child:
The mediator has a duty to promote the best interests of the children. The mediator also
has a duty to assist parents to examine the separate and individual needs of their children and to consider those needs apart from their own desires for any particular parenting formula. If the mediator believes that any proposed agreement between the parents
does not protect the best interests of the children, the mediator has a duty to inform
them of this belief and its basis.
STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS art. III(E), supra note 18, at 457.
" See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 958; Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: JudicialFunctions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 249-54
(1975).
80 The ABA Family Law Section's Standards for Family Mediators do not provide any guid-
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However, we did not approach the "best interests" test from a
philosophical vacuum. Rather, we began our evaluation of custody
plan proposals with the assumption, based upon significant empirical
evidence,31 that a child's interests are usually best served by maximizing his contact with both parents in the post-divorce family and
ensuring both parents a meaningful role in his future.32 This philosophy can express itself in a wide variety of post-separation cooperative
parenting arrangements, including but not limited to joint decisionmaking ("legal custody")
and joint responsibility for child care
33
("physical custody").

Parents voluntarily undertaking custody mediation are much more
likely to be receptive to such a philosophy than are parents who resort to the adversary system to settle a custody dispute.3 4 Mediation,
in turn, further encourages and reinforces this cooperative attitude.
Mediation may thus be seen as a procedural handmaiden to joint
custody and a device for implementing its values. 5
We view joint custody as a philosophical commitment rather than
a rigid rule of law mandating that all parental decisions be made
jointly or that the child spend fifty percent of each week with each
parent. A family's circumstances are too unique and the available
empirical evidence too tentative to allow someone who is helping parents formulate post-separation custody arrangements to say unequivocally that particular divisions of time or decision-making responsibility between parents are always in a child's best interests. Rather, a
mediator helping parents devise a custody plan should properly take
ance to help mediators define the "best interests of the child."
SI See, e.g., J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 5, at 132-34; Abarbanel, Shared Parenting After Separation:A Study of Joint Custody, 49 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 320 (1979). See
generally Clingempeel & Reppucci, Joint Custody After Divorce: Major Issues and Goals for
Research, 91 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 102 (1982) (review of empirical research on joint custody).
82 See Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 486-88, 432 A.2d 63, 65-66 (1981). In adopting this premise,
we assume that neither parent lacks basic parenting skills or capabilities or is physically or
emotionally abusive to or neglectful of the child. Even if a parent had such problems, the child
might be better served by maintaining contact between the child and the parent undergoing
rehabilitation and therapy than by isolating the child from the parent indefinitely. See
Santosky v. Kramer, 344 U.S. 745, 765 n.15 (1982); Giarretto, Humanistic Treatment of Father-Daughter Incest, in CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE FAMILY AND THE COMMUNITY 146
(1976).
" Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 497-500, 432 A.2d 63, 71-72 (1981). See Steinman, supra note
11, at 740-41.
Pearson, supra note 6, at 10.

35 The Denver Mediation Project, for example, reports that couples who engage in mediation
are far more likely to develop joint custody arrangements than couples who utilize the adversarial process. Pearson, Thoennes & Van Kool, Mediation of Contested Child Custody Disputes, 11 COLo. LAW. 336, 339 (1982).
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into account a wide variety of factors, such as the extent of child care
and decision-making responsibilities each parent is willing to assume;
the parents' work schedules, personal obligations and future plans;
the size of the parents' living accommodations and their suitability
for children; the parents' geographical proximity to one another; the
presence or absence in the family of siblings and stepparents; the age,
mental and physical capacity and schooling needs of the child; and
the child's own wishes.
Our joint custody orientation served as a basic philosophical
framework for the custody mediation. To build on that framework,
we intended to ascertain the particular needs and interests of the
child whose custody arrangement we would be mediating. We felt
that our Clinic was as qualified as any person or institution to help
the parents formulate the details of a custody plan that would serve
that individual child's "best interests." Our mental health professionals would interview the child and the parents to learn about their
concerns regarding separation and divorce, to ascertain their custody
plan preferences and then to assess the situation independently.3
Our lawyers would talk to each family member, examine the family's
situation in great detail, and draft the documents necessary to make
a custody plan concrete. No other institution that might come in contact with this family except, perhaps, an unusually well-structured
and staffed family court, would devote as much time, attention and
expertise as we could to a determination of the child's needs and an
assessment of the quality and feasibility of the parents' proposed custody plans.
We defined the purposes of mediation, therefore, as twofold: facilitating cooperation and communication between the family members
so as to encourage maximum contact with the child by both parents
and helping the parents develop a custody plan specifically tailored
to their child's individual interests. We hoped that this early delineation of our goals for the mediation would give the parents a common
reference point - their joint interest and involvement in their child's
welfare - to guide them in their post-separation planning. 7 In that
way, the negotiations between the parents could focus on their plans
for the child's future rather than on their past difficulties.38 We were,
to use Roger Fisher's and William Ury's phrase, trying "to separate
See infra text accompanying notes 84-95.
R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING To YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN
84-96 (1981).
8 Id. at 5-7 (discussing the opposite effects of employing positional as opposed to cooperative bargaining).
'

87 See
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the people from the problem.""9
This "best interests" orientation of the mediation was complemented by the limitation we imposed on the scope of the process.
Rather than discussing all disputed issues between the separating
spouses, we restricted the mediation's agenda to child-related top-

ics.40 We would not attempt to reconcile the parties although, admittedly, the children would not face the harsh consequences of divorce
if genuine reconciliation did occur. Even if we had been equipped to

do marriage counseling, the parents had not requested such services. 4 1 Our objective was limited to helping the parents recognize

and manage the effects of their planned separation or divorce on
their child.4 2

We decided to mediate issues of child support as well as custody.
Child support is a fundamental obligation both parents owe their

children morally and legally,'48 an obligation we believe to be inextricably intertwined with child custody." Inadequately funded physical
custody arrangements are a major source of psychological distress for
children, who often experience not only a loss of emotional support
but also a significant decline in their standard of living after di-

vorce.45 We therefore concluded that we could not properly mediate a
custody agreement without ensuring that it provided for the child's
financial support.

In addition, patterns of behavior in child custody and support are
generally linked. More contact with a child seems to encourage
8

Id. at 11.

40

But see O.J. COOGLER, STRUCTURED MEDIATION IN DIVORCE SETTLEMENT 117 (1978) (no re-

striction should be placed on the issues to be mediated).
41 We were prepared to refer them to a marriage counselor if it appeared that the parents
wanted those services.
4'
"Once divorce is inevitable, the professional's role changes to one of attempting to make
the separation as painless as possible, to help the couple maintain their individual dignity, and
to assist the children to make the transition by reducing the conflict inherent in the process of
divorce." J. HAYNES, supra note 5, at 4. Cf. O.J. COOGLER, supra note 40, at 118 (mediation
rules explicitly state that the decision to dissolve the marriage is not at issue).
43 See Brescia v. Fitts, 56 N.Y.2d 132, 436 N.E.2d 518, 451 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1982); N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW. §§ 236, 237, 240 (McKINNEY SuPP. 1983-1984); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 461(A) (McKINNEY
1983).
" The California mandatory custody mediation statute, CAL. Civ. CODE § 4607 (West Supp.
1983), provides for mediation of only custody and visitation, not support. This limitation may
be due to that state's reliance on formulas to determine child support amounts. See Lefcourt,
The Use of Mediation to Resolve Family Disputes, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 29, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
46 J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 5, at 23-25, 42-43, 231; Weitzman, The Economics
of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support
Awards, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1181, 1260-63 (1981).
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higher levels of payment of child support." Voluntary, out-of-court,
written settlements also seem to encourage higher levels of child support payment. 47 It thus serves the child's interest in adequate
financial support to have child support issues addressed in custody
mediation.
Unlike custody and child support, issues of spousal support, division of marital assets and other property arrangements necessitated
by a disruption of the family unit focus primarily on each parent's
rights and not on their common obligations to their child. We recognize, of course, that resolution of these issues can be integrally connected to the child's welfare; their resolution may well affect the
child's standard of living, and the parents' satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the arrangements will affect their willingness to cooperate
on parenting issues.48 Property division and spousal support issues,
however, are inherently "zero-sum,''49 in the sense that one parent's
gain is the other parent's loss; giving one parent more property or
maintenance means taking it from the other. Since it is a fair assumption that each parent will seek to maximize his or her own welfare, negotiations that deal with zero-sum issues are likely to be highly adversarial. o Thus, the argument that each spouse should be
separately represented in such negotiations gains force."
Custody and support issues can also be characterized as a zerosum. Increased child support paid by one parent may lessen the support obligation for the other, assuming that the child's financial
needs are defined as a fixed sum. Likewise, more time for one parent
alone with the child means less time available for the other parent.
Finally, if one parent has the exclusive right to decide where a child
will be educated, the other does not.
It is not, however, in the child's, and thus society's, best interests
46 D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY 128 (1979).
47 U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Series P. 23, No. 124, Child Support and
Alimony: 1981 (Advance Report) 2 (May 1983).
46 J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 5, at 24-26. In comparing the post-divorce income
of husbands and wives with dependent children, even assuming full compliance with alimony
and child support orders, Weitzman concluded that the presence of children greatly exacerbates "the discrepancy between the [spouses'] postdivorce standards of living, especially among
middle-class and upper-middle-class couples, that fosters much of the feeling of injustice expressed by so many women [as the traditional custodial parent] after divorce." Weitzman,
supra note 45, at 1244-46.
4 See L. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY 11 (1980).
50 G. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 130 (1983).
" But see Levine v. Levine, 56 N.Y.2d 42, 436 N.E.2d 476, 451 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1982) (sug-

gesting that an attorney for one spouse can draft a separation agreement for both without the
agreement being per se invalid).
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for parents to view custody and child support issues as inherently
adversarial; the child needs the time, guidance and financial resources5 2 of both his parents to cope with the enormous difficulties of
post-divorce life. Mediation, which can encourage parents not to take
a zero-sum view of child-related issues but rather to work together
toward common parenting goals, serves as a particularly suitable process for resolving child custody and support issues. By excluding
property division and spousal support from the mediation agenda, we
were, in effect, telling the parents that they could treat each other as
adversaries when it came to the purely monetary issues between
them but not when it came to their child.
Focusing the initial mediation efforts on the child-related issues
and leaving other matters for later resolution had two distinct benefits. First, limiting the agenda to the child maximized the possibility
of parental agreement on at least some issues, thereby laying a foundation of trust and cooperation on which future agreements could
build. Second, resolving the child's future first reflected a symbolic
commitment to the view that the parents' and society's first concern
in the process of disentangling families should be the children. Morally, "[t]he choice between the possibility of harm inflicted on a mature, responsible adult and a developing, helpless child seems a clear
one."" Thus, while we purposefully restricted the scope of the mediation to our areas of competence and expertise," we believe that directing initial mediation efforts to child-related concerns also makes
good policy sense.
We were aware that limiting the range of issues on which the parents could negotiate during the mediation reduced the possibilities of
"integrative bargaining,"" that is, allowing the parents to make
trade-offs and compromises on all divorce-related issues. For example, limiting the negotiation agenda to child custody and support
would prevent a parent from giving up the right to a certain level of
See supra note 43 (citing authorities).

53See T.

SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 45 (1960).
" Note, Alternatives to "ParentalRights" in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151, 156 (1963). See also Younger, MaritalRegimes: A Story of Compromise
and Demoralization, Together with Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV.

45, 85-90 (1981).
" See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILITY Canon 6 ("A Lawyer Should Represent
a Client Competently"); id. EC 6-1; id. DR 6-101 (1980). Cf. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS art. IV (C), supra note 18, at 458 (requiring mediator to "endeavor to assure"
participants have "sufficient understanding of governing law," thus implying an obligation on
the mediator to understand the governing law).
" See Lowenthal, A General Theory of Negotiation Process, Strategy, and Behavior, 31
KANSAS L. REv. 69, 95-96 (1982).
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maintenance in exchange for increased contact with his or her child.
Such integrative bargaining might have maximized the parties' satisfaction with the ultimate settlement. On the other hand, it also could
have permitted the parent in the stronger bargaining position at the
beginning of the dispute to extract from the other parent concessions
on custody arrangements that were unrelated to the child's welfare.
We believed that parents should not be required to sacrifice contact
with their child in exchange for necessary economic support or
needed support in exchange for custody or visitation privileges. As
one writer has said, "such behavior [by the parents] comes close to
active abandonment of ethical propriety insofar as the child's inter'57
ests are concerned.

Historically, allowing trade-offs between monetary and custody issues has had a particularly adverse financial effect on mothers. As the
traditional primary caretaker of children in this society, mothers tend
to be "risk-averse" 58 about their role in the child's life; when custody
and maintenance issues are linked in bargaining, women faced with
uncertainty about the custody arrangement that a court may order
after litigation are more likely than men to make financial concessions to avoid jeopardizing their custody rights."
The justification for structuring the agenda to favor the parent
who is less willing to risk his or her contact with the child does not,
however, turn on the likely gender of that parent; many men are also
obviously concerned about the risk of losing contact with their children after divorce. Rather, the justification turns on the child's interest in meaningful contact with both of his or her parents following
their divorce. 60 Given our goals as mediators, we necessarily rejected
structuring the agenda to reward the parent who was willing to risk
his or her relationship with the child to gain advantage in an equitable distribution and maintenance struggle.
B.

Who Is the Client?61

Current rules of professional responsibility require the lawyer operWatson, supra note 8,at 59.
68

Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 970-71.

Id.; Weitzman, supra note 45, at 1252-53.
60See Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 174-75, 418 N.E.2d 377, 379-80, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862, 865
(1981) (visitation with the noncustodial parent following divorce should not be considered that
"

parent's "natural right" since such a characterization ignores "the primacy of the child's welfare"). See also supra note 11 (citing authorities).
61 See

Appendix A, I V3 & 4 for the portion of the retainer agreement dealing with the issues
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ating in the adversary system to represent his or her clients zealously
and without conflicting obligations toward other parties."' Although
multiple representation of potentially conflicting interests is permitted in limited circumstances, 63 it is the disfavored exception to the
general rule.
The basic assumption of mediation, in contrast, is that the disputants have common interests that can be shaped into a mutually beneficial agreement. A mediator generally works with parties in potential conflict, reversing the basic assumption of the lawyer in an
adversary system - that parties with even potentially conflicting interests are better served by separate attorneys.
In an attempt to fit mediation into the framework of traditional
legal ethics, we asked ourselves the traditional lawyer's question: who
is our client? As mediators between parents who would be seeking to
reach an agreement on child custody and support issues on which
their interests would both converge and diverge, we could conceivably
define our client as any of the following: one parent, both parents,
the child, the entire family, or no one.
We felt it essential to avoid taking sides with either parent in the
mediation ' unless necessary to further the child's interests. We
could not, then, represent one parent and leave the other unrepresented, a technique that has been suggested6 5 to circumvent the ethical problems inherent in representing two clients with potentially divergent interests.66
We could represent both parents, provided that their interests
were "substantially but not entirely compatible" and they consented
discussed under this heading.
62 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule

DR 5-105 (1980);

MODEL RULES OF PROFES-

1.7 (1983).

I
/d.
See STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS art. III, supra note 18, at 457.
's Silberman, Professional Responsibility Problems of Divorce Mediation, 7 FAM. L. REP.
(BNA) 4001 (1981). See Ohio State Bar Ethics Committee, Op. 30 (O.S.B.A. Report 780 1975)
(permitting an attorney to draft a separation agreement when representing one parent only if
the other parent consents to being unrepresented). A recent New York Court of Appeals case
has stated that an attorney who drafts a separation agreement and represents one spouse while
the other is unrepresented is not per se overreaching. Levine v. Levine, 56 N.Y.2d 42, 436
N.E.2d 476, 451 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1982). Thus, we may have been ethically permitted to represent
only one parent. We nevertheless deemed such a role arrangement inconsistent with a mediator's neutrality.
" MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105; id. EC 5-14 to 5-16 & 5-19 (1980).
See STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS art. III(A), supra note 18, at 457 ("A lawyer-mediator shall not represent either party during or after the mediation process in any legal
matters.").
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after full disclosure. 67 Nevertheless, we declined to do so. We pre-

ferred that the parents look to outside counsel to protect their selfinterests. First, there is an obvious danger inherent in joint represen-

tation

-

that the lawyer's advice to one client would compromise his

or her obligations to the other. Second, we feared that, despite our

best intentions, we might unconsciously identify with one parent's
situation and be less impartial than the standard for joint representation requires. Finally, representing the parents and not the child was

incompatible with our view that the child's interests should prevail if
a conflict arose between the parents' and the child's interests.6
Despite our decision not to represent either or both parents, we
knew they would view us as an authoritative source of legal advice.
Moreover, any custody and support agreement they signed would

necessarily affect their legal rights. We therefore felt ethically compelled to advise them of their potential conflict of interests to ensure
that their consent to the process would be fully informed. 9 Because
we had refused to represent either parent, it was also important that
the parents were aware of the option to seek independent legal advice
at any time during the process. 0

"

See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1980). The Code of Profes-

sional Responsibility envisions a lawyer serving as a "mediator" between clients with conflicting
interests, see id EC 5-20, but does not define the mediator's role or explain how a lawyer can
play that role consistent with the general prohibition of Canon 5 against representing conflicting interests. See New York City Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op.
80-23 (1981), reprinted in 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3097 (1981) [hereinafter cited as N.Y.C. Bar
Ass'n, Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. 80-23].
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, not yet adopted by the state bar associations, also
envision that the attorney can act as an intermediary "between clients," MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2(a) (1983), when "the clients' interests are substantially though not

entirely compatible," id. Rule 2.2 comment. Rule 2.2, however, "does not apply to a lawyer
acting as arbitrator or mediator between or among parties who are not clients of the lawyer,
even where the lawyer has been appointed with the concurrence of the parties." Id. The Model
Rules of Professional Conduct do not clearly distinguish between a lawyer acting as an intermediary between clients and a lawyer acting as a mediator without clients. The comments to Rule
2.2 suggest that how the lawyer designates herself is a decision left to her discretion, presumably to be made after consultation with the affected parties.
The ABA Family Law Section's Standards of Practice for Family Mediators seem to suggest
that a lawyer acting as a mediator is prohibited from regarding either parent as a client, see
supra note 66.
" See supra text accompanying note 54.
69 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(c) (1980) (compelling disclosure
of multiple representation). See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983);
N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. 80-23, supra note 67;
Crouch, Divorce Mediation and Legal Ethics, 16 FAM. L.Q. 219, 248-50 (1982).
70 See Boston Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Op. 78-1 (1978); N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n Op. 80-23,
supra note 67; Silberman, supra note 65, at 4003; STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY
MEDIATORS, art. VI(A), supra note 18, at 459. See infra text accompanying notes 92-100.
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Having declined to represent either or both parents, we could have
taken the alternative position that we represented the child - that

the parents, in effect, had hired us without charge to be the child's
lawyer.7 1 If we had explicitly established a lawyer-client relationship
with the child'7 however, we would have been bound by the prohibition against disclosing a client's confidences without consent. 73 A law-

yer whose client is a child has the same obligation not to disclose
client confidences as a lawyer whose client is an adult.7 This prohibi-

tion seemed inappropriate in a process designed to facilitate open
communications within the family unit. We wanted to be free to tell
the parents whatever their child told us, without agonizing about
whether our professional obligations to our client would permit such
action, if we believed that it would help the parents plan more effec-

tively for the child's future. We also wanted our affiliated mental
7 See New York City Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. 82-18
(1983).
71 See generally Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody
and Visitation Disputes, 87 YALE L.J. 1126 (1978).

73 MODEL CODE OF'PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
SIONAL CONDUCT

DR 4-101 (1980);

MODEL RULES OF PROFES-

Rule 1.6 (1983).

See Institute of Judicial Administration, American Bar Association, Counsel for Private
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, Rule 3.3 (1979) [hereinafter cited as JUVENILE JUSTICE
STANDARDS]. Rule 3.3 provides:
(a) Establishment of confidential relationship. Counsel should seek from the outset to
establish a relationship of trust and confidence with the client. The lawyer should explain that full disclosure to counsel of all facts known to the client is necessary for effective representation, at the same time explain that the lawyer's obligation of confidentiality makes privileged the client's disclosures relating to the case.
(b) Preservation of client's confidences and secrets.
(i) Except as permitted by 3.3(d), below, an attorney should not knowingly reveal a
confidence or secret of a client to another, including the parent of a juvenile client.
(d) Disclosure of confidential communications.
A lawyer may reveal:
(i) confidences or secrets with the informed and competent consent of the client or
clients affected ...
(ii) Confidences or secrets when permitted under disciplinary rules of the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility or as required by law or court order.
(iii) The intention of a client to commit a crime. ...
Id. (emphasis added). The comment to Rule 3.3(b) states that "an attorney [for a child] may
not reveal to parents statements made by the juvenile client within the professional relationship" unless one of the criteria for an exception to the rule of confidentiality is satisfied. Id.
comment. The comment to Rule 3.3(d) regarding disclosure of confidential communications
states, "Section 3.3(d) follows the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 4-101(c), in
specifying circumstances in which lawyers may reveal their client's confidences or secrets. Generally, these rules apply to juvenile cases as they do to other matters." Id. comment. See also
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1.14(a) (1983) ("When a client's ability to
make adequately considered decisions in connection with the representation is impaired, . ..
because of minority . . . the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal
client-lawyer relationship with the client.").
71

Parties,
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health professionals to have the same professional freedom to share
the child's concerns and problems with the parents. Characterizing
the Clinic's client as the child could hinder them as well as us in this
5
7

objective.

We also did not characterize ourselves as the child's lawyer because
we did not want to be bound by the child's definition of the objectives of the representation.7 6 Lawyers for children are bound by the
same requirements of zealous representation as are lawyers for
adults;77 if we deemed ourselves the child's lawyer, the ethical
precepts of the profession would require us to "abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation.17 Such zealous
advocacy of any position that the child might take, however, seemed
potentially inconsistent with our goals for the mediation: encouraging
the parents to communicate, cooperate and compromise in caring and
planning for their child after the separation or divorce and helping
them to define a particular custody plan that would more specifically
further their child's best interests.
Simply put, in defining their preferences for post-separation custody arrangements, children do not always know where their best interests lie.7 9 For example, a child's expressed preference to live with

one parent may be attributable to a particular stage of psychological
development, to the child's temporary anger at one parent for "causing" the divorce, or to a desire to bribe or punish one or both of
them. Younger children, in particular, lack the capacity for longrange thinking and projection that is important for such critical decisions and often come to regret their initial custodial choices later in
life.80 In addition, asking a child to make a choice of custodial arrangements can create an extremely stressful, frustrating, and guiltinducing situation for the child,81 especially since we could not guarantee that his parents would respect his stated preferences.
Judges in litigated custody battles are charged to consider a child's
See American Medical Association, Judicial Council, Op. (1982); Sussman, Reporting
Child Abuse, 8 FAM. L.J. 245, 297-99 (1974).
7' MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

EC 7-7, 7-8 (1980);

MODEL RULES OF PRO-

Rule 1.2(a) (1983).
7 "[T]he goals of adequate disclosure of all relevant information and the achieving of just
results in juvenile proceedings can best be obtained by counsel assuming in juvenile court the
functions of counseling and advocacy in the same manner as in other courts of civil and criminal jurisdiction." JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 74, at 7.
70 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983).
70See Lincoln v. Lincoln, 24 N.Y.2d 270, 247 N.E.2d 659, 299 N.Y.S.2d 842 (1969); J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 5, at 314-15. See generally Note, supra note 72, at 1163-72.
FESSIONAL CONDUCT

"

J.

WALLERSTEIN

& J. KELLY, supra note 5, at 314-15.

01Id., supra note 5; see S. Meehan, supra note 9, at 65-67, 80-91.
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preferences and to give them greater weight as the child grows older,
but not to treat them as dispositive5 2 We decided to give the child's
preferences the same weight in mediation as they would have in the
courtroom. Our conclusion was that custody mediators should listen
to the child's custodial preferences but must do so critically and
should feel free to disregard them with good reason.
Our decision not to be the child's lawyer in the mediation was also
based on a related belief that the allocation of decision-making power
in the family undergoing separation should parallel the legal system's
allocation of such power in the pre-divorce family. In a legally intact
family, the parents have a constitutionally protected right to override
a child's preferences on most major issues concerning the child's care
and custody, 8 although they should obviously take their child's
wishes into account. One of the major problems in the post-divorce
family is the perception by the child that the authority and competence of his parents have been eroded by the divorce experience.8 4
We attempted to structure the mediation process to protect and reinforce parental decision-making authority in the post-separation family while focusing the parents' attention on the child's best interests.
The achievement of this goal would be more difficult if we gave the
child, and only the child, a legal representative during mediation.
This would magnify the child's capacity to influence his parents' decisions out of proportion to his capacity to do so before the family's
separation.88
Thus, despite the Clinic's usual designation as a law guardian
bound zealously to advocate the child's preferences, we decided to
play a different role in this mediation setting. The decision was not
an easy one and took extended discussion within the Clinic. Ultimately, we supported our conclusion by distinguishing our proper
role as child advocates under court appointment from our role when
two parents seek our help voluntarily to mediate a dispute concerning their child.
" See Freiderwitzer v. Freiderwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 432 N.E.2d 765, 447 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1982);
Dintruff v. McGreevy, 34 N.Y.2d 887, 316 N.E.2d 716, 359 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1974); Salk v. Salk, 89
Misc.'2d 883, 889, 393 N.Y.S.2d 841, 845 (Sup. Ct. 1975); CONN.

GEN. STATS.

§ 46b- 56(b) (West

Supp. 1984) (child's preference is one factor in any best interests determination, "if he is of
sufficient age and capable of forming an intelligent preference").
83 See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). See generally Developments in the Law - The

Constitution and the Family, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1156, 1351-57 (1980).
" See J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 5, at 36, 168. See generally C. LASCH,

HAVEN

IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY BESIEGED (1979).
88 See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEoRE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 105-

11 (1979).
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By asking a judge to resolve their custody dispute, parents declare
themselves unable to resolve their differences on their own. One parent, or perhaps both, believes that the coercive decision-making
power of the court is preferable to private agreement on post-separation custodial arrangements. Therefore, once parents invoke the coercive power of the court to resolve their dispute, the presumption of
autonomy and competence that normally protects parental decisionmaking power from state scrutiny is weakened. When the parents
cannot decide on the child's future themselves, counsel for each parent will zealously promote their client's particular views in an attempt to influence the court's exercise of its coercive power. In these
circumstances, the state may appoint a lawyer for the child to aid it
in deciding on a custody arrangement, even if the parents' decisionmaking autonomy is reduced as a result. If coercion is to be exercised, the child also should be heard as to how.
If the parents voluntarily seek mediation, however, we assume that
they desire and are able to settle their disagreements without invoking the coercive power of a court. The parents have not declared
themselves presumptively incapable of jointly making decisions concerning their child by asking someone else in authority to make those
decisions for them. The rationale for giving their child, and no one
else, a zealous advocate for his preferences thus disappears in the mediation setting.
We rejected the fourth alternative, representing all three family
members, for the same reasons that we declined to represent the parents jointly 0 or to represent the child 87 Such triple representation
would further compound the ethical problems of potentially conflicting loyalties and confidentiality obligations to multiple clients.
We thus ultimately concluded that we could best serve our two
goals - defining and advocating the particular child's "best interests" and promoting a general atmosphere of communication, compromise and cooperation in a reconstituted family unit - by presenting ourselves as advocate for neither the parents nor the child,"8 but
as, in effect, "counsel for the situation.

8

9

Mediators, we decided,

" See supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
87 See supra text accompanying notes 71-85.

See Oregon Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 70-46 (1980); Boston Bar Ass'n Comm.
on Ethics, Op. 78-1 (1978); New York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 258
(1972); Silberman, supra note 65, at 4002.

0 This phrase was coined by Justice Brandeis in describing the attorney's role when the
interests of a client, such as a child, are so closely tied with those of other parties. G. HAZARD,

ETHICS INTHE PRACTICE OF LAw 64-65 (1978). See also Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D.
Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REV. 683, 702 (1965); Note, supra note 72, at 1176-77. But see Crouch,
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should not be anyone's personal "attorney" in the traditional sense."'
C. Relationship of Outside Counsel to the Mediation Process9 '
At several points in the retainer agreement we tried to encourage
the parents to look to outside counsel for advice regarding their individual legal rights. 2 We anticipated that the parents might consult
with private counsel for help in deciding whether to undertake the
mediation, 3 in weighing the advisability of various interim custody
and support proposals suggested during the course of mediation,"
and before signing any final custody agreement that we drafted for
them.9
Their attorneys, however, would not personally participate or be
present as silent observers during the mediation sessions.9 6 Our theory was that the presence of counsel for the parents during the mediation would significantly complicate the negotiation process and increase the likelihood that it would develop an adversarial, "zero-sum"
tone. The presence of counsel could also hinder communication between the parents; many lawyers have a tendency to speak for their
clients during a negotiation session even if their clients are present.
Since one of the major benefits of mediation reported by researchers
is that participants tend to understand each other better because
they communicate directly, 97 we believed that the parents were more
supra note 69, at 228 (criticizing the phrase for being intentionally vague and devoid of ethical
standards).
90

For a general critique of this type of solution to mediation's ethical problems, see Crouch,

supra note 1 and Crouch, supra note 69.
91 See Appendix A,
3, 7, 10 & 11 for the portions of the agreement discussed in this
section.
92 See STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS art. VI, supra note 18, at 459 (stating
that mediators should urge participants to obtain such outside legal advice).
" See infra text accompanying note 155.
" See infra text accompanying note 70.
" See supra text accompanying notes 156-57.
" The ABA Family Law Section's Standards of Practice for Family Mediators state that
"[e]ach of the mediation participants should have independent legal counsel before reaching

final agreement," STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS art. VI(A), supra note 18, at
459, but do not authoritatively decide whether the mediation participants should have a right
to have their counsel present at mediation sessions. The Standards do state, however, that the
mediator should reach agreement with the participants on this issue. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE
FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS art. VI(B), supra note 18, at 460. We agree with the judgment not to
resolve this issue in promulgated standards and to leave it to be decided jointly by the mediator
and participants.
97 Pearson & Thoennes, Divorce Mediation: Strengths and Weaknesses Over Time, in ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION, 51, 67-68 (1982).
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likely to develop a lasting framework for post-divorce cooperative
parenting if they spoke for themselves. If a parent, after consulting
with outside counsel, came to believe that he or she was treated unfairly in the mediation, that parent could so inform the other parent
and the mediators and insist that the unfairness be rectified.98
We hoped, however, that the parents would take the custody and
support agreement that we drafted to their respective attorneys for
review.99 We would then communicate directly with the parents' lawyers to explain provisions in the agreement or to answer any questions that they might have. The parents' consultation with independent counsel after they had reached basic agreement would not only
be likely to make the final agreement more complete and polished
but, more importantly, would provide both the parents and the Clinic
with some assurance that the agreement was fundamentally fair to
both parents. 100 Further, the costs to the parents of consulting with
outside counsel would be minimized because most of the detailed
work of negotiating and drafting the agreement would have been accomplished before outside counsel became heavily involved.
We did not suggest that the child should have similar access
to
outside counsel primarily because we did not think that adding a
child's lawyer to the mediation process was likely to benefit the child
significantly. We planned to give the child's preferences for custodial
arrangements approximately the same weight in the mediation that
most court-appointed child advocates actually give those preferences
in representing a child in a contested case,101 regardless of the theoretical obligations such lawyers have to represent the preferences of
their youthful clients zealously.10 2 Our goals for the mediation - promoting settlement and cooperation between the parents and protecting the child's individual interests - were also similar, if not identical, to the goals of most court-appointed law guardians.' 3 Further,
having a child's lawyer in the process might undermine rather than
08 If the parent continued to feel that his or her interests were not being addressed, he could
withdraw from the mediation without prejudice. See infra text accompanying notes 150-54.
" See STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS art. VI(D), supra note 18, at 460 (requiring review of agreements reached in mediation by independent counsel for each
participant).

100 See

infra text accompanying note 151.

101 See generally Note, supra note 72 (empirical survey showing that many court-appointed

lawyers for children advocate custody plans that are contrary to their client's expressed
desires).
'0' See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
"I8Note, supra note 72.
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reinforce parental decision-making authority.0 4
D. Cooperation Between Lawyers and Mental Health
ProfessionalsDuring Mediation and the Child's Role in the
Mediation Process"'8
The Clinic intended that the primary mediators in this case would
be law students working under law faculty supervision. 10° We decided, however, that our law student-mediators would have the additional assistance of the Clinic's affiliated mental health professionals.
We felt that our consulting psychiatrist and full-time social worker
could fulfill several valuable functions in the custody mediation: enhancing the child's understanding of and adjustment to the divorce
and sharing the child's concerns with his parents; improving our effectiveness as mediators by increasing our understanding of the psychodynamics of the mediation; and injecting an additional and important view of the child's best interests into the mediation process.
One of the primary advantages of having an interdisciplinary custody mediation team is that mental health professionals are available
to talk with the child. These conversations fulfill the child's essential
need to discuss his reactions to his parents' separation with a sympathetic "someone" who is not preoccupied with personal reactions to
the separation.10 7 The mental health professional can also give the
child a broader perspective on the divorce process and on his feelings
about it; even a child who is too young to express his preferences for
the future can benefit from the opportunity to have some of his questions answered by a mental health ally. Finally, the mental health
professionals can identify any particular fears, concerns or misunderstandings that the child may have about the divorce and can share
the child's perspective with his parents, thus providing the parents
with helpful insights into the child's adjustment and suggested methods for easing his transition to post-divorce life. 0 8.
104 See supra text accompanying notes 83-85.
105 See Appendix A,
2, 5 & 6 for the portions of the retainer agreement discussed in this

section of the article.
100 Disclosure of student status is required under the New York statute that enables supervised law students in law school clinical programs to engage in the practice of law. See supra
note 16 and accompanying text. The students who undertook the mediation had undergone
intensive simulation training in child advocacy and had read extensively in the social science
and legal literature on child advocacy and mediation. They were supervised by a faculty member who teaches family law and has experience in law school clinical programs.
& J. KELLY, supra note 5, at 38-54, 317-18.
Id. See generally J. HAYNES, supra note 5.

107 J. WALLERSTEIN
108
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Another function that we hoped our mental health professionals
could perform was helping us, as mediators whose primary training
was in law rather than human relations, to handle with sensitivity
and finesse the emotion-laden discussions among members of a family in crisis. 10 9 Some practitioners argue that mediation should be
conducted by trained social workers, with attorney involvement limited to the agreement drafting stage.110 While we agree that mental
health professionals are better trained than lawyers to help divorcing
parents cope with the emotional aspects of their separation, we felt
that attorney involvement in the discussions would be beneficial in
many, if not all, stages of the mediation as well.
Lawyers who are trying to promote agreement focus on solving
problems concretely. Lawyers are also sources of authority on the legal implications of possible solutions to the numerous problems faced
by a separating family."' Lawyer-conducted mediation should thus
help the parents focus on the problems - as opposed to the people
- involved in formulating a custody plan and ensure that the written agreement resulting from the mediation accurately embodies the
parents' concerns and conforms to existing law. Thus, although we
did not rule out having the Clinic's mental health professionals conduct some of the mediation sessions themselves, either alone or in
conjunction with us, as lawyers we also wanted to be prepared to
function skillfully as mediators." 2
We felt that our mental health professionals could improve our effectiveness as lawyer-mediators in several ways. First, by explaining
their perceptions both of the individual family members and of the
friction and interaction to be expected in a family in flux, the mental
health professionals might be able to help us better understand the
dynamics of the mediation. '" Second, they might be able to give us
100 Coombs, supra note 3, at 494; Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29 (1982);

Smith, Non-JudicialResolution of Custody and Visitation Disputes, 12 U.C.D.L. Rev. 582, 598
(1979) ("In these emotional situations attorneys must consider the human problem in order to
best resolve the legal problem.").
110 J. HAYNES, supra note 5, at 3-14, 139-45.
" Coombs, supra note 3, at 491.
'12 This fluid and flexible approach towards each profession's role may be contrasted with,
for example, Coogler's "structured mediation" model. "Structured mediation" requires that a
family counselor conduct the mediation within an explicit set of very formal rules. Once the
couple has reached an agreement, an "impartial advisory attorney" is brought in to answer any
questions, give legal advice, and solemnize the result in formal separation agreement terms. See
O.J. COOGLER, supra note 40. See also Coombs, supra note 3.
110

Cf. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS art. V(D),

supra note 18, at 459 ("The

mediator shall inform the participants that emotions play a part in the decisionmaking process.
The mediator shall attempt to elicit from each of the participants a confirmation that each
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advice on how to raise difficult, personal issues with the parents, how
to observe and respond to subtle cues that the parents and child
might be sending us and how to help the parents communicate with
each other more openly, comfortably and rationally. Finally, they
could even assist us with the seemingly technical aspects of mediation, such as recommending a seating arrangement conducive to comfortable discussions.
Our mental health professionals could also help us answer perhaps
the most difficult question a custody mediator faces - what role
should the child play in the process? 11 4 In the particular mediation
we conducted, the answer to the question was relatively easy since
there was only one, four-year-old child involved. We did not expect
any direct participation by a four-year-old in the actual negotiations;
such a young child would almost surely not understand most of what
was being said by the adults involved and could easily be hurt by the
communications. We anticipated instead that our mental health professionals would interview the child privately and then convey the
child's feelings to his parents.
As a natural result of drafting the retainer agreement, however, we
did consider the general question of how children should be involved
in custody mediation. Given that children and parent-child relationships differ, this issue cannot be definitively resolved. Rather, the decision must be made case by case, based upon the same types of considerations that should guide a judge's or custody investigator's
decision whether to interview a child and ask his preferences for custodial arrangements. Some of the most important factors are: Does
the child have a sufficient level of cognitive functioning and emotional maturity to prepare for participation in the mediation? What
have the parents already told the child about the deterioration of
their relationship? Is the child's involvement in the mediation likely
to enhance or harm his relationship with one or both parents? Are
the child's preferences and feelings likely to be better understood and
taken into account by the parents if the child expresses them directly
or if a trained professional speaks to the parents on the child's beunderstands the connection between one's own emotions and the bargaining process.").
114 The Family Law Section's Standards of Practice for Family Mediators state that the mediator has a duty to promote the best interest of the child, see supra note 28, but provide no
guidance as to how a mediator should organize the proceeding to fulfill that duty. We think the
Standards should be amended to require the mediator to discuss with the parents the child's
role in the mediation and at least to consider personally interviewing the child, if at all feasible.
Otherwise, the child's interests in the process of decision as well as the outcome are too likely
to be disregarded by the adults participating in it, including the mediator. See infra text accompanying notes 116-17.

[Vol. 48

Albany Law Review

half? Evaluation of these and the numerous other factors that must
be considered before a child becomes extensively involved in the mediation sessions requires the insights of both the legal and the mental
health professions. Since we did not have an absolute rule about
whether and how the child should participate in the mediation, it
seemed to us that the best way for a mediation retainer agreement to
address the issue was to put the parents on notice that such participation might be recommended by the mediators but would be discussed with the parents before it would occur." 5
The final function we envisioned for the mental health professionals was helping the parents and lawyers to determine the type of custody arrangement that would serve the child's best interests. We had
consciously rejected the notion that a custody mediator's role was
simply to serve as a passive facilitator of parental agreement and the
corollary notion that any plan on which the parents could agree
would be, by definition, a good plan for the child.116 Rather, we believed that the Clinic and its affiliated mental health professionals
should take an active role in helping the parents define and promote
the best interests of their child. We decided that an independent assessment of the child by our mental health professionals might be
needed because the parents' description of their child's reaction to
the separation could be distorted by their own reactions to the situation or based upon statements that the child had made to appease
them.

7

We concluded that the Clinic's mental health professionals should
assess the family situation in as much detail as necessary to ensure
that the custody arrangement on which the parents ultimately agreed
would be beneficial for the child. We felt that it would be necessary
for our mental health professionals to meet with the child and the
parents at least once."' If, in their professional judgment, it was advisable to conduct further family evaluations, they could interview
the family members more extensively at the Clinic or make personal
visits to the child's home or homes. Of course, they would also have
access to any information that we might obtain in the mediation
sessions.
By learning about the child's situation in as much detail as they
deemed appropriate, our affiliated mental health professionals could
See Appendix A,
'i

6.

See supra text accompanying notes 26-28. Accord
III(E), supra note 18, at 457.

STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY

MEDIATORS art.

M See J. WALLERSTEIN & J.

"s See supra note 114.

KELLY,

supra note 5, at 100-03, 115-17.
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develop a strong sense of the child's needs and the custodial arrangement alternatives. Their perspective on those needs and alternatives
would be informed by years of experience working with children and
families during and after divorce. They would therefore be in an excellent position to help determine whether some sort of joint physical
custody or joint decision-making authority would be beneficial for
the particular child.'1 ' If so, we felt that they could help the parents
decide on a custody plan that would serve those goals while also addressing their child's more individualized needs; if not, we felt that
they could help devise viable alternatives.
We tried to be sensitive to the privacy concerns of the family unit
involved in the mediation. We assumed, however, that parents willing
to talk in mediation about future cooperation for their child's sake
would be receptive to the services of mental health professionals
seeking to help the parents facilitate their child's adjustment to the
separation. 120 The only purpose in asking the parents to empower the
Clinic to investigate and appraise their family situation was to help
their children, a goal that they, presumably, would share. The ultimate checks upon the degree of intrusion into family privacy authorized by the retainer agreement were the confidentiality of the mediation process and the entirely voluntary nature of the couple's
involvement with the Clinic.' 21 If either or both of the parents objected to the involvement of mental health professionals in the mediation, the process would end.
Although we easily concluded that our affiliated mental health professionals should be involved in the mediation, there remained the
ethical question whether the Code of Professional Responsibility,
given its concern with preserving a lawyer's independent professional
judgment, permitted such cooperative mediation efforts between attorneys and professionals from other disciplines. 2 2 Many mediation
" See supra text accompanying notes 31-36.

Cf. supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
z See infra text accompanying notes 129-41 & 150-54.
1*0

112 See Silberman, supra note 65, at 4005-08. See generally MODEL CODE OP PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSMILITY Canon 3 (1980) ("A Lawyer should Assist in Preventing the Unauthorized Practice of Law."); id. Canon 5 ("A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on

Behalf of a Client."), and Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules thereunder.
The Standards of Practice for Family Mediators recently published by the ABA's Family
Law Section do not address the problems of collaborative mediation between lawyers and
mental health professionals explicitly. They do, however, attempt to set standards of practice
for non-lawyer family mediators acting alone, see STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY
MEDIATORS art. IV(C), supra note 18, at 458, as well as lawyers acting alone. Only the lawyermediator is allowed to "define legal issues" for the participants. Id. Presumably, this standard

would control collaborative mediation.
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services involve a great deal of cooperation between 'attorneys and
social workers.12 The general rule is that such cooperative arrangements are permitted,2 provided that the lawyers exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of
their "clients"' 3 and that
12 6
the nonlawyers do not give legal advice.

Under this standard, we concluded that the functions we planned
for mental health professionals would not raise ethical problems. Certainly, permitting our social worker or psychiatrist to speak with the
child and to share the substance of those discussions with us would
not interfere with our independent professional judgment any more
than the independent judgment of a judge would be tainted by the
report of a custody investigator regarding her conversations with a
child.12 7 The help of our affiliated mental health professionals in improving our interviewing and mediation skills would also be ethically
innocuous. Their assistance in conducting some mediation sessions,
with or without lawyers present, would similarly not intrude upon
our domain, provided that they did not give the parents legal advice
- something that they would be no more likely to do than we would
be likely to give the parents a discourse on child development. We
had worked together long enough to know that each professional had
a strong sense of his or her professional limitations and role
boundaries.
The assistance of our affiliated mental health professionals in applying to the particular family in question what seems to be a legal
As a non-profit, law school-based clinical program that does not charge fees for its services,
we did not need to face the ethical dilemmas raised when lawyers and nonlawyers split fees.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-8 (1980); id. DR 3-102. See Silberman,

supra note 65, at 4005; N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. 8023, supra note 67. See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(a) (1983).
:23 See, e.g., O.J. COOGLER, supra note 40, at 23-20; Coombs, supra note 3, at 489-91.
" See e.g., N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n, Comm. of Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. 80-23, supra
note 67; Connecticut Bar Ass'n Informal Op. 8301, reprinted in 9 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2013
(1982) (endorsing a "team" mediation approach).
"1 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrry DR 2-103(D) (1980). See N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n,

Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. 80-23, supra note 67; Silberman, supra note
65, at 4006. See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(d)(3) (1983).

Igo Canon 3 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility provides that attorneys should
not assist in the unauthorized practice of law. One commentator has noted, however: "So long
as the lawyer performs the legal services in mediation and the mental health professional uses
his/her expertise to move the parties along, a reasonable interpretation of Canon 3 should permit experimentation with [an interdisciplinary model]." Silberman, supra note 65, at 4005. See
also N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. 80-23, supra note 67;
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.5 (1983). See also supra note 122.
III Cf. Kesseler v. Kesseler, 10 N.Y.2d 445, 180 N.E.2d 402, 225 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962) (discussing
due process issues raised by the involvement of mental health experts in litigated custody
cases).
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standard, the best interests of the child, raised potentially more
troublesome ethical issues. It could be argued that, by engaging in a
collaborative application of law to fact, we would be delegating legal
decision-making to nonlawyers. However, we concluded that this conceptual concern did not pose significant problems in practice.
We neither anticipated nor, in fact, experienced being forced to
choose between our judgments and those of the mental health professionals in helping the parents formulate a custody and child support
plan. We discussed cases with our coworkers in the mental health
field so frequently and exchanged insights and expertise so consistently that any decisions the Clinic reached were necessarily the product of the cumulative thinking of all the persons and professions involved in the case.
Continued collaboration seemed entirely appropriate in the context
of a child custody mediation. Determining the best interests of a
child, after all, cannot properly be viewed as a purely legal question;
law, mental health, social mores, humanity, common sense and intuition all play a part in defining the child's best interests. Indeed,
courts themselves solicit the opinions of mental health experts in
making custody determinations. 2 8 We believed it unproductive to attempt to parse the "best interests" decision into "legal" and "mental
health" components, as the Code of Professional Responsibility
would seem to contemplate, especially when so many courts recognize
the desirability of collaborative decision-making. To us, the possibility of lawyers delegating legal decision-making to non-lawyers was
simply not a realistic concern in the context of the mediation process
we envisioned.
29
E. Confidentiality Against The Outside World1

Voluntary mediation is more likely to succeed if all of the participants are assured that communications made during the mediation
are kept confidential against the rest of the world. Otherwise, the dialogue might be inhibited by a lack of candor and cooperation or the
process abused to gain discovery or other advantage in a later litigated custody battle. We therefore wanted to ensure that we would
not be put in the position, should the mediation fail, of being asked
to reveal our files to the court, of having our mental health profes"' See N.Y.

FAM. CT. ACT

§ 252 (McKinney Supp. 1983);

AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIA-

(1982).
"I See Appendix A, 1 7 for the portion of the retainer agreement relating to this discussion.

TION, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLINICAL ASSESSMENT IN CHILD CUSTODY
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sionals called to the witness stand and asked which of the parents is
the more fit, or of being involved in any other way in subsequent
litigation.
We could not, however, be fully assured that the legal system
would respect the confidentiality of the mediation process if what
was said during mediation became relevant to a court dispute between the parents. None of the potentially applicable evidentiary
privileges seemed to apply. We had specifically disclaimed the existence of a lawyer-client relationship with any of the participants in
the mediation. 130 Therefore, the attorney-client privilege did not exist.181 Our associated mental health professionals defined their "patient" as the family, not its individual members. They, too, thus disclaimed the existence of the conventional doctor-patient or social
worker-client relationship even though such a relationship might
have protected the resulting communications as privileged." 2 We also
could not rely on the privilege for settlement negotiations3 ss which
has so many exceptions that attempts to claim it in court seem to
lead to disclosure rather than confidentiality as a general rule.""
Moreover, even if there were an argument that an evidentiary privilege covered the mediation proceeding, we still faced the problem
that courts have frequently overridden privilege claims in custody litigation by requiring mental health professionals who have helped
promote settlement or marital reconciliation between the parents to
testify in subsequent litigation. Courts often reason that they must
130See supra text accompanying notes 61-90.
13, N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 4503(a) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

§ 2292 (McNaughton rev. 1961) ("The mere fact that the services are rendered by an attorney
does not necessarily establish that he was acting in such capacity so as to render the communications as privileged.") Id. § 2303 (Supp. 1983).
Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, it is possible to "act as an intermediary"
without disclaiming the attorney-client relationship. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 2.2 (1983). However, the comment to that section explicitly recognizes that "the prevailing
rule is that as between commonly represented clients the [attorney-client] privilege does not
attach. Hence, it must be assumed that if litigation eventuates between the clients, the privilege will not protect any such communications and the clients should be so advised." Id.
comment.
"8I N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW. § 4507 (McKinney Supp. 1983) (psychologist/patient privilege);
N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW. § 4508 (McKinney Supp. 1983) (social worker/client privilege). See 8 J.
WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2286 (Supp. 1983).
388PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE § 408 (N.Y. Law Rev. Comm. 1982). See J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 1061 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
'3 See White v. Old Dominion S.S. Co., 102 N.Y. 660, 662, 6 N.E. 289, 291 (1886) (admissions of fact, even though made during an offer of settlement, are admissible); Comeaux, supra
note 3, at 89 (factual admissions are admissible to show bias or prejudice, to impeach a witness
or if otherwise discoverable).

1984]

Alternatives to Litigation

hear the otherwise privileged information to determine the best interests of the child. The court's duty as parens patriae has been held
in such cases to override any confidentiality claim. 135
Thus, we were uncertain whether communications made during the
mediation and the work product of our attorneys and mental health
professionals would be deemed confidential in any subsequent court
proceedings. Our confidentiality dilemma could be solved if the New
York legislature enacted a statute, similar to statutes existing in
other jurisdictions, specifically making both public and private mediation confidential.186 In the absence of such a statute and in the face
of the uncertainty in the case law, we asked the parents to sign a
specific pledge to respect the confidentiality of the proceedings.
While we were unsure that such a promise would be held binding in a
courtroom struggle,13 7 we believed that it would augment any arguable legal claim of confidentiality and make the parents and their attorneys recognize that an attempt to breach the mediation's confidentiality would be strenuously resisted.13 8
Additionally, because we would be receiving confidential informa38'Barth v. Barth, 74 A.D.2d 1002, 427 N.Y.S.2d 98 (1980); New York ex rel Hickox v. Hickox, 64 A.D.2d 412, 410 N.Y.S.2d 81 (1978); Perry v. Fiumano, 61 A.D.2d 512, 517-18, 403
N.Y.S.2d 382, 385-86 (1978). Cf. M. v. K., 186 N.J. Super. 363, 452 A.2d 704 (Ch. 1982) (involving a marriage counselor privilege).
I" See CAL. Civ. CODE § 4607(c) (West Supp. 1983) (mediation proceedings are confidential,
and communications during mediation are "official information"); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1040
(West 1966) ("official information" is privileged). Cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. 45:8B-29 (West 1978)
(marriage counselor privilege); but cf. M. v. K., 186 N.J. Super. 363, 452 A.2d 704 (Ch. 1982)
(marriage counselor privilege overriden by the court in best interests of the child).
A detailed discussion of the potential applicability of various evidentiary privileges is beyond
the scope of this article. The discussion in the text is intended only to suggest some of the
problems that a statute dealing with the confidentiality of mediation must address.
187 See Perry v. Fiumano, 61 A.D.2d 512, 516-17, 403 N.Y.S.2d 382, 385 (1978); 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2286 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (at common law no pledge or oath of privacy could
avail against the demand for truth in court).
'" The ABA Standards of Practice for Family Mediators place a duty of confidentiality on
the mediator. They also require the mediator to ask the parties to agree not to require the
mediator to disclose statements made during the mediation to third parties. STANDARDS OF
PRACTICE FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS art. IH(A), supra note 18, at 456. We have no disagreement
with the Standards on this point. The Standards go on, however, to require the mediator to
inform the participants of the mediator's inability to bind third parties (presumably courts and
lawyers for the parties) to the confidentiality pledge. Id. art. II(B), at 457. They also imply that
the mediator must warn the participants that statements made in mediation could come back
to haunt them in later litigation. Id. art. II(C), at 457. On these points, we part company with
the Standards. They require the mediator to deliver to the participants a mixed message about
the confidentiality of the process that can be interpreted cynically by those who hear it. Moreover, since the law in this area is new and developing, it is entirely plausible to argue that
statements made in mediation will be held confidential by a court, especially if the mediator
vigorously resists any attempts by third parties to compromise that confidentiality.
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tion from both parents during the course of the mediation, we disclaimed any representation of the child or either of the parents in
any possible future dispute."3 ' We also asked the parents to pledge
that their counsel, with whom we envisioned communicating directly, 140 would respect the confidentiality of the mediation process.
We presumed that, as clients, they could control their lawyers' con1 41
duct on this issue.

F.

142
Candor Within The Mediation Process

Despite our belief in the need for absolute confidentiality as
against the outside world, we expressly disclaimed confidentiality
within the mediation process, either between the parents themselves
or between the parents and the Clinic staff. Only a general rule of
candor during mediation could promote the open atmosphere we believed essential for facilitating agreement.
In line with this philosophy, we informed each parent that we
would make available to both parents any legal advice or evaluative
report that we provided to either of them. 4 8 Conversely, we informed
each parent that we might reveal to the other parent anything either
of them told us during an individual session if such disclosure would
further the purposes of the mediation.1 4 4 We did not oblige ourselves
to recount every trivial or painful fact revealed to us by either parent. For example, if the husband shared his perceptions of the wife's
parents with us in an individual session, we would not necessarily
repeat his criticisms to his wife unless, of course, the subject became
'a' MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-20 (1981) ("After a lawyer has undertaken to act as an impartial arbitrator or mediator, he should not thereafter represent in the

dispute any of the parties involved."); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2(c)

(1983) ("Upon withdrawal [as an intermediary], the lawyer shall not continue to represent any
of the clients in the matter that was the subject of the intermediation."). See N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n,
Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. 80-23, supra note 67; Crouch, supra note 69, at
249; STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS art. III(A), supra note 18, at 457 (discussed and quoted supra note 66).
140 See supra text accompanying notes 91-100.
"' 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2321 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
'4, See Appendix A, T 8 for the portion of the retainer agreement reflecting our positions on
the issues discussed in this section of the article. Many of the concepts discussed in this section
are reflected in a retainer agreement developed by Richard A. Gardner, M.D. (unpublished
papers), author of FAMILY EVALUATION IN CHILD CUSTODY LITIGATION (1982), THE PARENTS'
BOOK ABOUT DIVORCE (1979), and THE BoYs' AND GIRLS' BOOK ABOUT DIVORCE (1971).
" See N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. 80-23, supra note
67, at 249.
144 Cf. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS art. 1(7), supra note 18, at 456 (requiring mediator to discuss issue of separate sessions with participants).
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relevant to the mediation. We believed, however, that we should have
the discretion to reveal such communications if we felt it appropriate.
Similarly, we reserved the discretion to reveal to the parents communications made by their child. Again, we did not feel bound to
disclose to the parents every communication that the child made to
us or to our mental health professionals. 4 5 For example, we would
not feel obligated to report a child's statement to us that he loved his
mother better than his father if we feared that such a revelation
could only hurt the father's feelings unnecessarily and poison his future relationship with his child. In general, however, we believed it
important to be free to share the child's concerns with his parents.
We also informed the parents that we would expect them to be
candid with the mediators and with each other by supplying information, particularly about their finances, to the other spouse and to us
upon our request.'46 We worried about the possibility, for example,
that one parent might have hidden assets from the other that would
increase his or her ability to pay child support. Furthermore, even if
the parents knew each other's financial situation, we would need to
become familiar with their finances to help advise them of appropriate levels of child support.
We imposed the same requirement of complete disclosure on the
parents that a New York court would have imposed.' 7 This decision
was prompted in part by the special responsibility to protect the
child that we had assumed by becoming custody mediators. It was
also motivated by our belief that the negotiations on child support
would be more rational if they were grounded in actual facts and
figures. More importantly, imposing a norm of full disclosure seemed
essential to building the atmosphere of trust, confidence and cooperation between the parents that we deemed necessary to develop an
agreement with which each parent would be reasonably satisfied and
to which each would therefore be likely to adhere. 4"
Significant nonparental figures in the child's life often have important information on how to maximize the child's well-being in developing custody arrangements. Therefore, if we had been appointed by
:45

See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.

Cf. O.J. COOGLER, supra note 40, at 122 (full disclosure of finances and other relevant
information required during mediation); STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS art.
146

IV(A), supra note 18, at 458 (same).
'47 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1983) (compulsory financial disclosure in equitable distribution/maintenance/child support controversies); 22 N.Y.C.Ct. R. §
117.2 (1983) (outlining the detailed "statement of net worth" required).

'4 See supra text accompanying notes 37-54.
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a court as law guardian for the child, we would have wanted to review
the child's school and medical records and talk to the child's teachers
and doctors if necessary for the zealous representation of the child.
As mediators, however, we felt such extensive intrusion into family
autonomy and privacy was unjustified without specific parental consent, which we would not seek absent a significant indication during
the mediation that further investigation was necessary. 1" 9 We thus
chose not to include a provision in the retainer agreement requiring
the parents, before beginning mediation, to consent to our review of
the child's records and consultation with other professionals.
G. Withdrawal from Mediation'"
The fundamental assumption underlying the mediation retainer
agreement was the voluntariness of both the parents' and the Clinic's
involvement in the process. For the parents, the knowledge that they
could terminate the process at any time made the whole endeavor
both more palatable to them and more fragile; an otherwise reluctant
parent might be encouraged to try mediation because of the assurance that he could withdraw at any time, but the same knowledge
might encourage him to leave the mediation if it became at all uncomfortable. Although we certainly did not endorse unilateral, arbitrary termination of mediation by one parent, we realized that it
would be useless to attempt to force a parent to participate in mediation against his will; some commitment by both parents would be
necessary for the process to work. We therefore made it clear to the
parents that they could withdraw from the mediation at any time
without prejudice.
As mediators, we expressly reserved a right to terminate the mediation if further sessions would be unproductive. One parent's abuse
of the process to delay a final resolution of the issues would obviously
be detrimental to the child's interest in stabilizing his custodial arrangements as quickly as possible. We hoped that the threat of our
withdrawal would deter this strategy. If the deterrence was not successful, however, the retainer agreement provided a mechanism for
ending the process.
We also reserved the right to withdraw from the mediation if necessary to avoid facilitating an agreement that might be contrary to
the child's interests. Preservation of this right was the ultimate proSee supra text accompanying notes 83-86 & 120-21.
160 See Appendix A,

9 for the portion of the retainer agreement dealing with this issue.
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tection for the Clinic's professional integrity. If the parents insisted

on a custody and support plan that we felt would be harmful to their
child or if they were unwilling to comply with procedures we felt

would be necessary for determining their child's best interests, we
wanted to be able to withdraw from the mediation rather than become mere scriveners of the parents' agreement.

The Clinic's right to withdraw also provided us with a procedure
for dealing with an overreaching spouse."' 1 For example, the husband

might persuade the wife to make child care or child support concessions that we thought were clearly not in her interests. Such an arrangement would also not be in the child's best interests, because the
bitterness and acrimony that would probably result from such an un-

fair settlement would destabilize the agreement and reduce parental
cooperation. 152 In this situation our continued involvement in the mediation would require us to choose between giving the wife legal ad-

vice that would be prejudicial to her husband and facilitating an
agreement that would be prejudicial to the wife and potentially
harmful to the child's interests. Both courses of action would be ethically problematic, and withdrawal would be our only alternative. Fur-

thermore, although the Clinic's withdrawal would represent a drastic
step given the parents' emotional investment in the mediation, it
would pose no formal ethical concerns because the retainer agreement did not establish a lawyer-client relationship with any media-

tion participant.153 Whatever real prejudice the parents suffered as a
result of our withdrawal would be a necessary cost of preserving our
professional integrity and our right to make an independent assess54
ment of the child's best interests.1

I'l See J. HAYNES, supra note 5, at 63-70; STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS,
art. V, supra note 18, at 458.
15' See J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 5, at 181-94.
The Standards of Practice impose a duty on the mediator to withdraw if continuation of the
process would harm or prejudice the participants.They make no specific mention about
prejudice to the child's interests, an oversight that should probably be corrected. STANDARDS OF
PRACTICE FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS art. V(B), supra note 18, at 459. The Standards do, however,
make the mediator responsible for assuring the reasonableness of "agreement being approached." Id. art. V(B), supra note 18, at 459. When combined with the duty the Standards
impose on the mediator to promote the child's best interests, see supra note 28, the mediator's
duty to withdraw from an approaching agreement that harms the child could easily be read into
the Standards. We do not think, however, that such an important duty should be left to
implication.
"6 See supra text accompanying notes 61-90.
14 Arguably, even if an attorney-client relationship existed, withdrawal would be ethically
permitted under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility:
Permissive Withdrawal from Employment.
If [withdrawal is not mandatory under DR 2-110(B)], a lawyer may not request per-
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Signing the Retainer Agreement"5

Given the detailed nature of the retainer agreement and the complexity of the issues it addressed, we decided to advise the parents to
wait several days and to seek the advice of outside counsel before

deciding whether to proceed with the mediation. We believed that
such procedures would help guard against one spouse's undue pressure on the other to enter mediation and would ensure that both
spouses had ample information and opportunity for reflection before
making the decision.
I.

Formalizing the Custody and Support
Agreement Reached in Mediation 6'

We planned to draft the parents' eventual custody and support
agreement and to review the draft with the parents to ensure that it
accurately embodied the oral agreement that they reached during
mediation. Before signing the final agreement, the parents would
15 7
again be orally encouraged to consult with independent counsel.

mission to withdraw in matters pending before a tribunal, and may not withdraw in
other matters, unless such request or such withdrawal is because:
(1) His client...
(e) Insists, in a matter not pending before a tribunal, that the lawyer engage in conduct
that is contrary to the judgment and advice of the lawyer but not prohibited under the
Disciplinary Rules.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(C)(1)(e) (1980).
Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct the attorney may withdraw from the representation of a client if no material adverse effect will result or if the client "insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(b)(3) (1983). If the lawyer were acting as an intermediary under the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, withdrawal would be permitted if the attorney felt that
his or her responsibilities to "any of the clients" would be improperly affected. Id. Rule
2.2(a)(3), (c).
The Standards of Practice for Family Mediators do not explicitly impose a requirement that
the participants or the child not be materially prejudiced by the mediator's unilateral withdrawal. The only condition on the mediator's withdrawal right in the Standards seems to be the
exhortation that "[i]f the mediator has suspended or terminated the process, the mediator
should suggest that the participants obtain professional services as may be appropriate." STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS art. V(F), supra note 18, at 459. We suggest that the
Standards be amended to require the mediator to consider and minimize the prejudice to the
participants or the child that might result from her withdrawal.
"I8See Appendix A,
11 & 12 for the text of the retainer agreement discussed in this
section.
18' See Appendix A,
10 for the text of the retainer agreement discussed in this section.
M See supra text accompanying note 70 and Appendix A, 3.
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The result of our deliberations on the appropriate ground rules for
custody mediation was a three-page, single-spaced, fairly comprehensive retainer agreement. Although we realized that such a formal document might discourage would-be clients from proceeding and that
the numerous disclaimers and warnings could be interpreted as undercutting the cooperative spirit of mediation, we felt that full disclosure of the limitations and drawbacks of the process was required
to make the parents' consent to participation in mediation meaningful.1 58 Moreover, we felt that we could ameliorate the problem of excessive "legalese" 15 9 by explaining our concept of our role and objectives to the parents orally and in deliberately nontechnical language
at the first meeting, 160 before giving them the formal retainer agreement to read over and discuss with us. We also left open the possibility of making some limited revisions to the retainer agreement at the
outset of the mediation in accordance with the parents' wishes.

III.

PROVISIONS FOR MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY ARRANGEMENTS"'

The mediation of the custody arrangements described in Part II is
only the first step in helping separated or divorced parents cooperate
in caring and planning for their child. To further the child's best interests, the parents must also commit themselves to resolve future
disputes through a process that promotes continuing cooperation between them. We attempted to ensure such a commitment by creating
a future dispute resolution process through specific language in the
custody agreement.
The purpose of the dispute resolution procedure that we created
was to minimize the likelihood that the parents would use litigation
to enforce, interpret or modify the terms of the custody and support
agreement. If the parents could not resolve their disagreement privately, the dispute would be referred to mediation and then, perhaps,
I" See Crouch, supra note 69, at 248. Cf. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS art.
I(A)(4), supra note 18, at 456 (requiring the mediator to "assess the ability and willingness of
the participants to mediate").
'69 Other mediators recommend a much less formal style, thereby reducing the "tone" problem inherent in more legalistic documents. See Pearson, supra note 6, at 8-9.
1I" The Standards of Practice for Family Mediators require a mediator to conduct an orientation session before the actual sessions begin "to give an overview of the process and to assess
the appropriateness of mediation for the participants." STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY
MEDIATORS art. I(A), supra note 18, at 455.
161See Appendix B for full text of the provisions of the custody agreement discussed in this
section.
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to arbitration. Each dispute resolution step would involve a more intrusive, coercive power in the family's affairs.
We hoped and expected that the parents could resolve minor disputes regarding day-to-day custodial care informally, outside of the
dispute resolution process described in their written agreement. Research indicates that couples that successfully reach mediated custody agreements are "more confident about their ability to work out
problems, generate modifications with their ex-spouses and avoid returning to court than couples [that] try mediation and do not reach
the traditional adversary
an agreement or couples that rely solely16 on
2
process for custody dispute resolution.

Nevertheless, in drafting what we hoped would be a lasting custody
agreement, we had to anticipate that the parents might be unable to
reach agreement between themselves on major issues concerning
their child. The dispute resolution clause would give them a mechanism for resolving their disagreement without resort to the courtroom
by providing for a sequential process that would begin with an informal conference, proceed to mediation, and conclude, if necessary, in
arbitration. 1"
The dispute resolution procedure was also designed to provide the
parents with a way of reevaluating the agreement if either of their
circumstances or the circumstances of the child changed materially.
We provided that the agreement would be automatically reevaluated
in the event of a contemplated move by either parent more than a
certain distance from the area where both resided when the agreement was signed; cohabitation or pending remarriage of either parent; major illness, disability, or extended hospitalization of either
parent or of the child; or significant financial changes. These predictable events in the reconstituted family's life could undermine many
of the basic assumptions upon which the custody agreement was initially premised and thus necessitate its reevaluation."'4
A.

Private Negotiations Between the Parents

We chose to begin with the most informal means of dispute resolu16'

Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 97, at 63 ("[O]ne stable characteristic of the successful

mediation client is his or her orientation to the autonomous resolution of future custody and
visitation problems.").
"' See Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976); O.J. COOGLER, supra
note 40, at 171.
I" Cf. Pearson, supra note 6, at 8-9 (sample mediated custody agreement outlining similar

renegotiation-triggering events).
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tion - a meeting between the parents alone. By requiring face-toface discussion at the beginning of the dispute resolution process, we
emphasized the importance of private negotiations and ongoing communications between the parents concerning their child. 16
The informal conference procedure that the agreement created was
not without risk. It raised the possibility of overreaching by a "dominant" spouse, since a neutral outsider would not be present in the
meetings to protect the interests of the child or the other spouse. We
hoped, however, that the parents would be sufficiently influenced by
their favorable mediation experience to work together fairly for their
child's sake. If so, requiring the participation of a third party would
be unnecessarily expensive and intrusive. On the other hand, if the
parents had not evidenced a cooperative spirit during mediation, the
meet-and-confer procedure might be inappropriate.
The modification clauses required, however, that a lawyer draft
any changes to which the parents agreed at their informal meetings.
This requirement, by serving as a check against an overreaching
spouse who might pressure the other spouse to accept a change,
would help protect the best interests of the child. 6 We hoped that
the parents would ask their lawyer not only to draft the changes to
their agreement but also to give them an independent evaluation of
the wisdom of their proposed modification.
Another reason we mandated lawyer drafting of changes was that
the parents' custody and child support agreement was complex and
many of its clauses were interdependent. Levels of child support paid
by each parent, for example, were tied to the parents' respective child
care responsibilities, present and projected income levels, and tax
brackets. Thus, if the parents agreed to change one section of the
agreement to increase or decrease one parent's time with the child,
other sections of the agreement might require modification. The parents, moreover, might not be aware of the necessity of such modifications without the advice of counsel.
Under recent New York case law,167 one lawyer can draft a separation agreement, and presumably a modification to a custody agreement, for both spouses without it being per se invalid; some other
evidence of unconscionability in the agreement is required to make it
unenforceable. We took advantage of this case law in an attempt to
minimize the expense of future dispute resolution for the parents.
16 See supra text accompanying notes 31-37.
1
167

See supra text accompanying note 151.
Levine v. Levine, 56 N.Y.2d 42, 48, 436 N.E.2d 476, 478-79, 451 N.Y.S.2d 26, 28-29 (1982).
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The potential costs of mandating that each parent independently retain a lawyer seemed to us unjustified, especially given what we knew
of the financial circumstances of the parents and our belief that they
would deal fairly with each other in the future. We also were concerned that involving lawyers for each parent in the drafting risked
encouraging the parents to view the modification process as adversarial and "zero-sum" rather than as a continuation of their postseparation cooperation in the best interests of their child." 8
B.

Private Mediation

The modification clauses provided that problems that could not be
resolved in a private meeting between the parents with any necessary
drafting help and advice from one lawyer would be subject to a somewhat more formal phase of dispute resolution - mediation. These
particular parents agreed that, if a future dispute arose, the Clinic
should continue as mediator under the same terms and conditions as
in the initial mediation retainer agreement. Given our extensive
knowledge of the family, the Clinic was well-equipped to continue
performing the mediator's role. Agreeing to remain on call as
mediators also reflected our philosophy that we had an ongoing obligation to help the family adjust to the post-divorce environment. We
had to limit our commitment to the family to a one-year period, however, because the law students who conducted the initial mediation
would not be affiliated with the Clinic beyond that time. The agreement provided that, if new Clinic personnel were unable to undertake
the mediation after the one-year period expired and the parents
could not agree on a mediator themselves, the Clinic would designate
a mediator for them.
C. Arbitration
We provided that those problems that could not be resolved by
mediation would be referred to arbitration. We envisioned the mediator as a "gatekeeper" to the arbitration process. Before arbitration
could begin, the mediator would have to certify that the parents had
reached an impasse and that further mediation efforts would be unproductive. We hoped that the mediator could thus deter a parent
who, out of frustration or bad faith, wanted to terminate the media"' See supra text accompanying notes 48-52.
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tion unilaterally before either the mediator or the other parent
thought that chances for a negotiated settlement were hopeless. Conversely, we hoped that vesting this power in the mediator would prevent a parent from exploiting the mediation phase for delay purposes
when no real progress was being made. A mediator presumably would
not continue her efforts if both parents thought the process had no
chance of success or if one parent was being intransigent.16 9 By asking the mediator to function as a gatekeeper to the arbitration phase,
however, we sought to encourage the parents to reach an agreement
voluntarily.
If the mediator felt it necessary to invoke the arbitration process,
we hoped that the parents could choose the arbitrator themselves.
The agreement provided, however, that if the parents were unable to
agree on an arbitrator, they would have to refer the dispute to the
American Arbitration Association. 17 0 This mandatory reference was
designed to initiate the arbitration procedure without the undue delay and procedural wrangling that disserve a child's interests in the
speedy resolution of custody questions.
We decided to provide that the arbitrator should both consult the
child during the arbitration process and resolve the dispute in accordance with the law, including the governing legal standard of the
child's best interests. The American Arbitration Association's rules
do not require its arbitrators to base their custody awards on considerations of the child's best interests and permit, but do not require,
the arbitrator to interview the child. 17 ' An arbitrator, however, would
honor a couple's specific written agreement to consult with the child
and apply the "best interests" standard. 17 Requiring the arbitrator
l

See supra text accompanying notes 150-54.

170 The American Arbitration Association's Family Dispute Services has promulgated spe-

cially designed "Arbitration Rules for the Interpretation of Separation Agreements" and makes
available arbitrators trained in marital dispute resolution. American Arbitration Association,
Family Dispute Services, Arbitration Rules for the Interpretation of Separation Agreements
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Arbitration Rules] (available from the American Arbitration Associ-

ation). The American Arbitration Association is only an example of an organization willing to
arbitrate this type of dispute and we do not necessarily endorse their procedures over any
others. We chose to mention it in the clause because of the availability of their arbitration
services in the community where the parents resided. The Family Mediation Association also
provides arbitration services under their "Marital Arbitration Rules." See O.J. COOGLE, supra
note 40, at 131-44.
171The American Arbitration Association's Rule 10 permits the arbitrator to seek a profes-

sional opinion regarding the child's interests. Rule 9 gives the arbitrator a right to interview the
child. Arbitration Rules, supra note 170, at 5. However, these rules have been criticized because
they omit an explicit "best interests" standard for custody determinations. Spence & Zammit,
Reflections on Arbitration Under the Family Dispute Services, 32 AB. J. 111, 117 (1977).
172 See Spence & Zammit, supra note 171, at 117.
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to listen to the child's wishes and to resolve disputes according to
governing law and the "best interests" standard would ensure that
appropriate child-related factors would be considered and would also
enhance the likelihood of the arbitration award's enforcement in any
subsequent court proceeding. 173 These provisions would thus make it
less likely that a dissatisfied parent would try to challenge the arbitrator's award in court.
The custody agreement provided that the parents would share the
costs of future dispute resolution equally. At the informal conference
stage, the costs would presumably be negligible, but they would obviously increase as more formal processes were triggered. This gradation in costs would be an incentive to early dispute resolution. On the
other hand, if settlement were not reached at the informal conference
stage, the relatively higher cost of mediation and arbitration could
deter the less affluent parent from pursuing a valid claim. This
financial deterrent is minimal, however, compared with that
presented by litigation; parents who lacked informal dispute resolution options and who were forced to face the much greater expense of
lawyer-assisted litigation whenever informal negotiations failed
would be even less likely to pursue a valid claim.17 ' Additionally, if
there were an acknowledged disparity in wealth at the time of the
initial agreement or one were projected for the future, the allocation
of dispute resolution costs could easily be adjusted accordingly.
D. Litigation
Under the dispute resolution mechanism we proposed, the parents'
disagreement would not be subject to litigation, the most adversarial
and coercive process of all, until and unless both parents had exhausted all three alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (informal
conference, mediation, and arbitration). Arbitration awards in most
contexts are subject only to very limited, mostly procedurally-oriented judicial review:7 6 for example, to ensure the absence of fraud
'" See Philbrick, Agreements to Arbitrate Postdivorce Custody Disputes, 18 COLUM. J. LAW
& Soc. PROBS. - (1984) (forthcoming).
I'l In describing the families surveyed during their follow-up study, Wallerstein and Kelly
noted, "[o]nly if a woman was able to afford the legal fees entailed in going back to court for a
cost-of-living adjustment in child support was any change possible, and even then, there was no
assurance that such a request would be granted. Most women could neither afford the legal fees
nor did they relish the idea of entering into battle once again with their ex-spouses. And so,
many women lived on considerably less income than their ex-spouses." J. WALLERSTEIN & J.
KELLY, supra note 5, at 151.
115 A court becomes involved in arbitration issues only when a party: "(1) questions the arbi-
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in the presentation of evidence or of misconduct or bias on the part
of the arbitrator.1 7 6 In the context of custody disputes, however, some
state courts have reasoned that substantial deference to the arbitrator's decision cannot be squared with the state's parens patriae obligation to protect the child's best interests and have therefore insisted
upon de novo review of arbitration awards involving child custody
issues. 177 Although we could not guarantee that a dispute between
the parents would never be tried de novo in a courtroom, we designed
the arbitration clause to make this prospect as unlikely as possible.1 78
IV.

TOWARD A STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF MEDIATED
CUSTODY AGREEMENTS

Our experience has made us optimistic that mediation of custody
disputes can promote post-separation parental cooperation and thus
serve the best interests of children. Similar conclusions have been
reached by those states that have legislatively enacted custody mediation programs.179 The American Bar Association's Family Law Section has recently made a significant step forward in the profession's
recognition of the increasingly important role mediation will play in
resolving child custody disputes by publishing for comment its Standards of Practice for Family Mediators.180
Although significant work remains to be done in refining standards
trability of a dispute and seeks to stay arbitration pending litigation; (2) seeks to compel arbitration; (3) challenges the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate; or (4) attempts to enforce
an arbitration award." Meroney, Mediationand Arbitrationof Separation and Divorce Agreements, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 467, 475 (1979).
17 For example, the New York arbitration statute provides that:
The award shall be vacated on the application of a party who ... participated in the
arbitration . . .if the court finds that the rights of that party were prejudiced by:
(i) corruption, fraud or misconduct in procuring the award; or
(ii) partiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, except where the award was by
confession; or
(iii) an arbitrator ... [who] exceeded his power or so imperfectly executed it that a final
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made; or
(iv) failure to follow the procedure of this article, unless the party applying to vacate the
award continued with the arbitration with notice of the defect and without objection.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7511(b)(1) (McKinney 1980). See generally Meroney, supra note 175, at
475.
177E.g., Crutchley v. Crutchley, 306 N.C. 518, 293 S.E.2d 793 (1982); Agur v. Agur, 32 A.D.2d
16, 298 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1969); Sheets v. Sheets, 22 A.D.2d 176, 178-80, 254 N.Y.S.2d 320, 323-26
(1964).
178 See Philbrick, supra note 173.
179 See supra note 3.
10 See supra note 18.
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of practice and procedure for lawyers conducting custody mediation,
another issue will merit particular attention in the days ahead. As
mediation becomes more widespread and more and more mediated
custody agreements find their way into courtrooms in proceedings to
modify the custody arrangements they contain, 8 1 it will become increasingly important to begin addressing new questions: What weight
should courts accord to the mediated custody agreement? Should
they review the custody arrangements in the agreement de novo? Or
should they place a high evidentiary threshold in the path of the
challenging parent by requiring that parent to prove dramatically
changed circumstances? The answers to these questions will send a
message to divorcing parents, their attorneys and their children
about the value society attaches to the interests furthered by
mediation.
Courts have long viewed themselves as the institution in society
best suited to protect the welfare of children in custody and other
child-related disputes.1 82 More recent New York cases have suggested
that the state's courts will give. significantly less weight in the custody modification process to an arrangement that the parents
reached voluntarily than to an arrangement that a court has imposed
on the family following an adversarial hearing. 83 In part, this judicial
tendency to review private custody agreements de novo probably reflects an understandable and well-motivated fear that parents will
not consider their child's best interests in formulating voluntary custody arrangements to the extent that a court reviewing the parents'

"I See Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 97, at 64 (discussing the empirically documented
experience of the Denver Mediation Project, which indicates that successful custody mediation
clients are slower to begin filing for modification of agreements than couples who mediate unsuccessfully or utilize the adversary process, but that all couples eventually show comparable
rates of increased filing for modifications in court). But cf. Ilfeld, Ilfeld & Alexander, Does
Joint Custody Work? A First Look at Outcome Data of Relitigation, 139 AM. J. PSYCH. 62
(1982) (empirical study of 414 Los Angeles County custody cases over two years suggests that

relitigation rate for families in joint custody arrangements is significantly lower than relitigation rate in traditional sole custody/visitation arrangements).
"S'Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 433-34, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925) (The judge "is to put
himself in the position of a 'wise, affectionate, and careful parent,' and make provision for the
child accordingly.") (Cardozo, J.) (citation omitted).
188 In Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 432 N.E.2d 765, 447 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1982),

for example, the New York Court of Appeals implied that it would accord greater deference in
a custody modification proceeding' to a custody arrangement derived from a trial than to a
custody plan entered into through an uncontested stipulation. Id. at 94-95, 432 N.E.2d at 768,

447 N.Y.S.2d at 896. See Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167, 172, 436 N.E.2d 1260, 1263, 451
N.Y.S.2d 658, 661 (1982). See also Nessia v. Nessia, - Misc. 2d -, 467 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1013-14
(Sup. Ct. 1983) (court must undertake an independent review of uncontested applications to
confirm that changes in custody serve the best interests of the child).
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agreement is obliged to do.
These recent cases, however, seem to assume that there are only
two methods for resolving a custody dispute - negotiations between
the parents, who may or may not be represented by counsel, and litigation. In reality, there are many methods of settling custody disputes, including self-help techniques such as child snatching (which
we vigorously oppose), 18 negotiations with or without counsel, mediation, arbitration, and, of course, litigation. Each of these processes,
moreover, has innumerable variations that make categorical appraisal
difficult.
Some out-of-court custody dispute resolution processes may protect the child's best interests as well as or even better than an adversarial struggle supervised and coercively resolved by a court. Mediation, in particular, has several advantages over litigation: it helps
reinforce parental decision-making authority, encourages compromise
and cooperation between the parents, and resolves the child's status
quickly and privately. Because it results in voluntary agreement,
moreover, it has the potential advantage of promoting certainty and
stability in the child's life; a mediated agreement is presumably one
to which both parents are more willing and more likely to adhere
than a custody and support plan imposed on the parents by a court.
These general advantages of mediation suggest that a court should
think carefully before deciding to review de novo the custody arrangements reached through mediation. The legal community must
begin to develop a more refined and discriminating standard to determine what weight to accord the mediated agreement. Such a standard should balance the state's historic parens patriae obligation
against the public -

and children's -

interest in encouraging par-

ents to make their own custody and child support arrangements.
We suggest that the primary focus of the judicial inquiry should be
on how well the out-of-court settlement process was designed to protect and promote the best interests of the child. If the quality of the
process gives the court significant assurance that it has promoted
those interests, the court should give agreements resulting from the
process substantial weight by placing a heavy evidentiary burden on
the parent seeking change.
To assess the quality of the mediation process, the court might ask
itself a wide variety of questions, including but not limited to the
following: Did the mediators bind themselves to protect the best in14

See S.

(1983).
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terests of the child in the mediation? Was the process structured to
encourage the parents to step back from their purely personal concerns and to focus on the child's needs in developing their custody
and support plan? Did the mediators talk to the child to determine
his own wishes and, if so, in what depth? Did they independently
evaluate the child's interests? How? Did they design the process to
encourage the parents to cooperate in the future physical and emotional care and support of their child? Did the mediation also protect
the parents' individual interests by encouraging them to seek outside
legal advice? Was the mediation done by an interdisciplinary team?
What were the background and experience, and the respective responsibilities, of each of the team members? How many total hours
did the mediators spend on the case? How many mediation sessions
were held? Was the resulting custody and support agreement individualized to the particular family circumstances rather than copied
from standard forms?
Custody mediators might want to develop methods for making
such procedural information easily available to reviewing courts without jeopardizing the essential confidentiality of what is said during
the mediation process. 185 One possibility might be to describe the mediation procedures in some detail in contracts signed by both parents. A written retainer agreement describing the mediators' usual
procedures and objectives would help educate a court about the quality of mediation services provided and the qualifications of the
mediators without revealing the substance of any communications
made during the mediation. The procedural details for the particular
mediation process - for example, the number of hours spent interviewing each family member - could be set forth in the custody and
support agreement's preamble or appendix. These two documents
alone might give a reviewing court enough data to assess the quality
of the mediation process and thereby make it unnecessary for the
court or either party to subpoena the mediators or their private
records.
We leave it to future mediators, commentators, lawyers and courts
to continue the dialogue about how courts should treat custody and
child support agreements reached through mediation processes that
are conducted with varying levels of skill and sophistication. Serious
treatment of this issue is essential to ensure that a wide spectrum of
dispute resolution procedures is available to families involved in custody disputes.
"' See

supra notes 129-41 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

In our judgment, interdisciplinary custody mediation will and
should be an ever-growing component of the diverse custody dispute
resolution services available to parents and children. We also believe
that it is practically and ethically feasible for lawyers to participate
in custody mediation. We urge attorneys to help make such services
more widely available in their communities, particularly to low- and
middle-income families, and in the process to help refine our mediation ground rules and custody dispute resolution mechanism or to
develop their own. We also urge the judiciary to recognize the value
of thorough, professional custody mediation services by giving greater
deference to the parental agreements that they facilitate. Ultimately,
if the legal system takes mediation seriously, the beneficiaries will be
the innocent and unintended victims of the courtroom custody struggle: the children of divorce.
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APPENDIX A
FULL TEXT OF OUR MEDIATION RETAINER AGREEMENT

1. Focus and agenda of mediation. We agree to retain Morningside
Heights Legal Services ("the Clinic") to mediate, free of charge, a
dispute regarding the future care, parenting and support of our child.
We understand that it is Clinic policy in mediating such disputes to
focus primarily on the child's best interests while also taking into account the concerns and interests of both parents. We recognize that
the Clinic believes that a child's best interests are generally served by
the meaningful involvement of both parents in the child's life after
separation and that the Clinic hopes to promote such involvement
through the mediation process.18
2. Mediation team. We understand that Ms. Melissa D. Philbrick
and Ms. Dvora Wolff Rabino will be conducting the mediation for the
Clinic and that they are law students working under the direction of
Mr. Andrew Schepard, Associate Professor at Columbia Law School
and a Clinic supervisory attorney. We also understand that Ms. Philbrick and Ms. Rabino will have the assistance of Dr. Paul Nassar, a
consulting psychiatrist to the Clinic and Lecturer in Law and Psychiatry at Columbia Law School, and Ms. Nina Freedman, Director of
Social Services of the Clinic and a certified social worker.
3. Legal advice. We further understand that the Clinic will not
serve as a lawyer for either or both of us during this mediation and
we will not look to the Clinic to protect our individual interests in
this matter or to counsel us about the advisability of any plan from
either of our individual perspectives. We understand that if either of
us should wish advice about the legal benefits Or drawbacks of any
particular course of action to him or her personally, he or she should
consult with his or her own lawyer.
4. Conflict of Interest. We agree to allow the Clinic to work with
both of us despite our potentially conflicting interests on this matter.
We understand that the Clinic is permitted to work with both of us
simultaneously only because we have consented to such an
arrangement.
" The statement expressing our joint custody orientation was not contained in our initial
retainer agreement; instead, we had conveyed our philosophy to the parents orally at our first
meeting. In retrospect, however, we believe that this perspective was so influential in our approach to the mediation that it should have been included in the retainer agreement. See STANDARDS OF PRAC TiCE iOR FAMi Y MEDIATORS art. III(C), supra note 18, at 457 ("The mediator
shall disclose to the participants any biases relating to the issues to be mediated.").
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5. Investigation; use of mental health professionals. We understand the following Clinic policies. The Clinic believes that its role as
a mediator requires an understanding and investigation of the family
situation so that the Clinic's suggestions to the parties can be fully
informed. The Clinic, as an interdisciplinary endeavor, generally prefers to utilize the services of mental health professionals in the mediation process. For these reasons, the Clinic will want to meet with our
child and may recommend that Clinic-affiliated mental health personnel meet with either or both of us and visit our child's home or
homes.
6. Child's participation.We are aware that the Clinic may recommend that our child participate in some or all of the mediation sessions and that the reasons for that recommendation will be fully discussed with us when it is made.
7. Confidentiality of the mediation process. We recognize that the
mediation efforts will be compromised if information disclosed during
the course of mediation may be revealed to any outside parties or
used in a court in any litigation that may ensue. We understand that
the Clinic will respect the confidentiality of our discussions during
the mediation process. And, accordingly, we enter the mediation with
the mutual pledge that neither we, nor our agents, including our lawyers, will either individually or jointly:
(a) request anyone affiliated with the Clinic to represent either of
us or our child in connection with this dispute after an agreement has
been reached or the mediation has reached an impasse;
(b) either request or require anyone affiliated with the Clinic, including any mental health professionals retained by them, to provide
testimony in court in connection with this dispute;
(c) use any written reports or evaluations (or any work product associated therewith) provided by anyone affiliated with the Clinic, including mental health professionals, in any litigation that may ensue;
or
(d) use any statements made by either of us during the mediation
sessions, whether or not in the presence of the Clinic staff, in a court
of law.
It is our further pledge that any communication between the Clinic
and either or both of our lawyers will also be privileged and may not
be used in a court proceeding.
8. Candor within the mediation process. We understand that any
legal advice that is provided by the Clinic will be given to both parties in one another's presence. We also understand that the Clinic
may meet with us individually to discuss factual matters and that the
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mediators may reveal the substance of those conversations to the
parent who was not present. We realize, too, that, to facilitate a fair
and workable agreement, we may be asked to disclose information
and documents, including information about our finances, to each
other and to the mediators. We further understand that any evaluations or reports prepared by the Clinic's mental health professionals
will be disclosed to both of us and that the confidentiality of those
evaluations or reports under paragraph 7 of this agreement will in no
way be impaired by that disclosure.
9. Right to withdraw from mediation. We understand that either
or both of us may terminate the mediation process at any time for
any reason and that we may retract any oral agreements regarding
the subjects of the mediation that we have made until that time. We
recognize that the Clinic also reserves the right to withdraw from the
mediation if the mediators feel that their defined role as mediators or
the Clinic's stated policies would be compromised by their continued
involvement or that further mediation would not be productive.
10. Reviewing and signing agreements reached in mediation. We
understand that any agreement reached through the mediation will
be reduced to writing by the Clinic and, when signed by both of us,
will be binding on both of us and enforceable as a contract. We also
understand that both of us will be encouraged to review any such
written agreement with independent legal counsel before signing it.
11. Undertaking the mediation. We understand that we will be
given several days to consider whether we wish to sign this retainer
agreement and to discuss the provisions with our attorneys if we so
desire. We further understand that we have been given duplicate
originals of this agreement and that this agreement will not be effective until and unless each of us signs his or her original and mails it
to the Clinic. The Clinic will notify us simultaneously by letter when
it has received signed originals from both of us.
12. Signatures. Our signatures below indicate that we have read
this retainer agreement and that we agree to proceed with the mediation in accordance with the policies described.
Date

Signature

Date

Signature
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APPENDIX B
TEXT OF THE CUSTODY AGREEMENT'S FUTURE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

PROVISIONS

(1) Modification of agreement. The above provisions concerning
custody and child support may be modified from time to time as the
parents may agree. However, no such modification shall be construed
to be a permanent modification of this agreement unless reduced to
writing by an attorney chosen by the parents and then signed by
both of them. Costs or expenses of drafting and executing modifications to this agreement, if any, shall be shared equally by both
parents.
(2) Reevaluation of agreement. This agreement shall be reevaluated upon the occurrence of any one of the following events: (a) the
remarriage of either parent; (b) cohabitation by either parent with an
unrelated member of the opposite sex; (c) a move by either parent
beyond a 20-mile radius of New York City; (d) major illness, disability or extended hospitalization of either parent or child; or (e) any
substantial change in the financial or other circumstances of either
parent that could significantly affect the child's best interests.
(3) Renegotiation and dispute resolution mechanism. If a reevaluation of this agreement pursuant to paragraph (2) above should be
deemed necessary by either party or a significant controversy should
arise with regard to this agreement or any alleged breach thereof, the
following procedures shall be triggered:
(a) Conference: Father and mother shall first meet and confer
within five days of either parent's request for such a meeting in a
good-faith effort to come to an agreement. Any agreement reached
shall be reduced to writing in accordance with paragraph (1) above.
(b) Mediation: If father and mother are unable to come to an
agreement between themselves on any issue, the unresolved issue or
issues shall be submitted to mediation for resolution. The Clinic shall
serve as mediator for father and mother for one year from the execution of this agreement pursuant to the terms of the retainer agreement with the Clinic. Thereafter, mediation shall be conducted by
any neutral third party upon whom both parents agree. If the parents
fail to agree on a mediator, the Clinic shall designate a mediator for
them. Costs or expenses of the mediation, if any, shall be shared by
both parents.
(c) Arbitration:If, in the opinion of the mediator, mediation is unsuccessful in resolving any issues on which the parents disagree, the
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unresolved issue or issues shall be submitted to binding arbitration,
with the arbitrator to be agreed upon by both parents. In the event
that the parents are unable to agree upon an arbitrator, the arbitrator shall be appointed by the American Arbitration Association Family Dispute Services. Such arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the American Arbitration Association's Rules for the
Interpretation of Separation Agreements, except that the arbitrator
shall resolve issues involving the child's custody and support in accordance with the law and in a way that will further the child's best
interests, giving appropriate weight to the child's preferences as ascertained after consultation with him. Costs or expenses of the arbitration shall be shared by both parents, except that each parent shall
be responsible for his or her own attorney's fees.

